THE TAGUBA REPORT
May 5, 2004
Article 15-6 Investigaton of 800th Military Police Brigade
US Army Report on Abuse of Iraqi Prisoners
By Maj. Gen. ANTONIO M. TAGUBA
The report was prepared by Maj. Gen. Antonio M. Taguba on alleged
abuse of prisoners by members of the 800th Military Police Brigade at
the Abu Ghraib Prison in Baghdad.
It was ordered by Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, commander of Joint Task
Force-7, the senior U.S. military official in Iraq, following persistent
allegations of human rights abuses at the prison.
ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE 800th MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE
TABLE OF CONTENTS
References ............................................................ ...... 3
Background ............................................................ ... 6
Assessment of DoD Counter-Terrorism Interrogation and Detention
Operations In Iraq (MG Miller's Assessment).................................. 8
IO Comments on MG Miller's Assessment........... 8
Report on Detention and Corrections In Iraq (MG Ryder's
Report).................................... 9
IO Comments on MG Ryder's Report.................. 12
Preliminary Investigative Actions .................... 12
Findings and Recommendations
Part One (Detainee Abuse). .............................. 15
Findings ................................................. 15
Recommendations ................................. 20
Part Two (Escapes and Accountability) ........ 22
Findings ................................................. 22
Recommendations. .............................. 31
Part Three (Command Climate, Etc...). ......... 34
Findings ............................................. ... 36
Recommendations ...... ........................ 44
Other Findings/Observations ........................... 49
Conclusion ................................................ ............ 50
Annexes ............................................................ ...... 51
References
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12
August 1949Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
the Wounded and Sick in the Armed Forces in the Field, 12 August 1949
3. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 12
August 1949
4. Geneva Convention Protocol Relative to the Status of Refugees, 1967
5. Geneva Convention Relative to the Status of Refugees, 1951
6. Geneva Convention for the Protection of War Victims, 12 August 1949
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War, 12 August 1949DOD Directive 5100.69, "DOD Program for
Prisoners of War and other Detainees," 27 December 1972DOD Directive
5100.77 "DOD Law of War Program," 10 July 1979STANAG No. 2044,
Procedures for Dealing with Prisoners of War (PW) (Edition 5), 28 June
1994STANAG No. 2033, Interrogation of Prisoners of War (PW) (Edition 6),
6 December 1994AR 190-8, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained
Personnel, Civilian Internees, and Other Detainees, 1 October 1997AR
190-47, The Army Corrections System, 15 August 1996
14. AR 190-14, Carrying of Firearms and Use of Force for Law
Enforcement and Security Duties, 12 March 1993
15. AR 195-5, Evidence Procedures, 28 August 1992
16. AR 190-11, Physical Security of Arms, Ammunition and Explosives, 12
February 1998
17. AR 190-12, Military Police Working Dogs, 30 September 1993
18. AR 190-13, The Army Physical Security Program, 30 September 1993
19. AR 380-67, Personnel Security Program, 9 September 1988
20. AR 380-5, Department of the Army Information Security, 31 September
2000
21. AR 670-1, Wear and Appearance of Army Uniforms and Insignia, 5
September 2003
22. AR 190-40, Serious Incident Report, 30 November 1993
23. AR 15-6, Procedures for Investigating Officers and Boards of Officers,
11 May 1988
24. AR 27-10, Military Justice, 6 September 2002
25. AR 635-200, Enlisted Personnel, 1 November 2000
26. AR 600-8-24, Officer Transfers and Discharges, 29 June 2002
27. AR 500-5, Army Mobilization, 6 July 1996
28. AR 600-20, Army Command Policy, 13 May 2002
29. AR 623-105, Officer Evaluation Reports, 1 April 1998
30. AR 175-9, Contractors Accompanying the Force, 29 October 1999
FM 3-19.40, Military Police Internment/Resettlement Operations, 1 August
2001FM 3-19.1, Military Police Operations, 22 March 2001FM 3-19.4,
Military Police Leaders' Handbook, 4 March 2002 FM 3-05.30,
Psychological Operations, 19 June 2000FM 33-1-1, Psychological
Operations Techniques and Procedures, 5 May 1994FM 34-52,
Intelligence Interrogation, 28 September 1992FM 19-15, Civil
Disturbances, 25 November 198538. FM 3-0, Operations, 14 June 2001
39. FM 101-5, Staff Organizations and Functions, 23 May 1984
40. FM 3-19.30, Physical Security, 8 January 2001
41. FM 3-21.5, Drill and Ceremonies, 7 July 2003
42. ARTEP 19-546-30 MTP, Mission Training Plan for Military Police
Battalion (IR)
43. ARTEP 19-667-30 MTP, Mission Training Plan for Military Police
Guard Company
44. ARTEP 19-647-30 MTP, Mission Training Plan for Military Police
Escort Guard Company
45. STP 19-95B1-SM, Soldier's Manual, MOS 95B, Military Police, Skill
Level 1, 6 August 2002
46. STP 19-95C14-SM-TG, Soldier's Manual and Trainer's Guide for MOS
95C Internment/Resettlement Specialist, Skill Levels 1/2/3/4, 26 March
1999
47. STP 19-95C1-SM MOS 95C, Corrections Specialist, Skill Level 1,
Soldier's Manual, 30 September 2003
48. STP 19-95C24-SM-TG MOS 95C, Corrections Specialist, Skill Levels
2/3/4, Soldier's Manual and Trainer's Guide, 30 September 2003
49. Assessment of DOD Counter-Terrorism Interrogation and Detention
Operations in Iraq, (MG Geoffrey D. Miller, Commander JTF-GTMO,
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba), 9 September 2003
50. Assessment of Detention and Corrections Operations in Iraq, (MG
Donald J. Ryder, Provost Marshal General), 6 November 2003
51. CJTF-7 FRAGO #1108, Subject: includes- para 3.C.8 & 3.C.8.A.1,
Assignment of 205 MI BDE CDR Responsibilities for the Baghdad Central
Confinement Facility (BCCF), 19 November 2003
52. CJTF-7 FRAGO #749, Subject: Intelligence and Evidence-Led
Detention Operations Relating to Detainees, 24 August 2003
53. 800th MP BDE FRAGO # 89, Subject: Rules of Engagement, 26
December 2003
54. CG CJTF-7 Memo: CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance
Policy, 12 October 2003
55. CG CJTF-7 Memo: Dignity and Respect While Conducting Operations,
13 December 2003
56. Uniform Code of Military Justice and Manual for Courts Martial, 2002
Edition
ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE800th MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE
BACKGROUND
1. (U) On 19 January 2004, Lieutenant General (LTG) Ricardo S. Sanchez,
Commander, Combined Joint Task Force Seven (CJTF-7) requested that
the Commander, US Central Command, appoint an Investigating Officer
(IO) in the grade of Major General (MG) or above to investigate the
conduct of operations within the 800th Military Police (MP) Brigade. LTG
Sanchez requested an investigation of detention and internment
operations by the Brigade from 1 November 2003 to present. LTG
Sanchez cited recent reports of detainee abuse, escapes from
confinement facilities, and accountability lapses, which indicated
systemic problems within the brigade and suggested a lack of clear
standards, proficiency, and leadership. LTG Sanchez requested a
comprehensive and all-encompassing inquiry to make findings and
recommendations concerning the fitness and performance of the 800th
MP Brigade. (ANNEX 2)
2. (U) On 24 January 2003, the Chief of Staff of US Central Command
(CENTCOM), MG R. Steven Whitcomb, on behalf of the CENTCOM
Commander, directed that the Commander, Coalition Forces Land
Component Command (CFLCC), LTG David D. McKiernan, conduct an
investigation into the 800th MP Brigade's detention and internment
operations from 1 November 2003 to present. CENTCOM directed that the
investigation should inquire into all facts and circumstances surrounding
recent reports of suspected detainee abuse in Iraq. It also directed that
the investigation inquire into detainee escapes and accountability lapses
as reported by CJTF-7, and to gain a more comprehensive and
all-encompassing inquiry into the fitness and performance of the 800th
MP Brigade. (ANNEX 3)
3. (U) On 31 January 2004, the Commander, CFLCC, appointed MG
Antonio M. Taguba, Deputy Commanding General Support, CFLCC, to
conduct this investigation. MG Taguba was directed to conduct an
informal investigation under AR 15-6 into the 800th MP Brigade's
detention and internment operations. Specifically, MG Taguba was tasked
to:
a. (U) Inquire into all the facts and circumstances surrounding recent
allegations of detainee abuse, specifically allegations of maltreatment at
the Abu Ghraib Prison (Baghdad Central Confinement Facility (BCCF));
b. (U) Inquire into detainee escapes and accountability lapses as
reported by CJTF-7, specifically allegations concerning these events at
the Abu Ghraib Prison;
c. (U) Investigate the training, standards, employment, command policies,
internal procedures, and command climate in the 800th MP Brigade, as
appropriate;
d. (U) Make specific findings of fact concerning all aspects of the
investigation, and make any recommendations for corrective action, as
appropriate. (ANNEX 4)
4. (U) LTG Sanchez's request to investigate the 800th MP Brigade
followed the initiation of a criminal investigation by the US Army Criminal
Investigation Command (USACIDC) into specific allegations of detainee
abuse committed by members of the 372nd MP Company, 320th MP
Battalion in Iraq. These units are part of the 800th MP Brigade. The
Brigade is an Iraq Theater asset, TACON to CJTF-7, but OPCON to CFLCC
at the time this investigation was initiated. In addition, CJTF-7 had
several reports of detainee escapes from US/Coalition Confinement
Facilities in Iraq over the past several months. These include Camp
Bucca, Camp Ashraf, Abu Ghraib, and the High Value Detainee (HVD)
Complex/Camp Cropper. The 800th MP Brigade operated these facilities.
In addition, four Soldiers from the 320th MP Battalion had been formally
charged under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) with detainee
abuse in May 2003 at the Theater Internment Facility (TIF) at Camp
Bucca, Iraq. (ANNEXES 5-18, 34 and 35)
5. (U) I began assembling my investigation team prior to the actual
appointment by the CFLCC Commander. I assembled subject matter
experts from the CFLCC Provost Marshal (PM) and the CFLCC Staff Judge
Advocate (SJA). I selected COL Kinard J. La Fate, CFLCC Provost Marshal
to be my Deputy for this investigation. I also contacted the Provost
Marshal General of the Army, MG Donald J. Ryder, to enlist the support of
MP subject matter experts in the areas of detention and internment
operations. (ANNEXES 4 and 19)
6. (U) The Investigating Team also reviewed the Assessment of DoD
Counter-Terrorism Interrogation and Detention Operations in Iraq
conducted by MG Geoffrey D. Miller, Commander, Joint Task Force
Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO). From 31 August to 9 September 2003, MG
Miller led a team of personnel experienced in strategic interrogation to
HQ, CJTF-7 and the Iraqi Survey Group (ISG) to review current Iraqi
Theater ability to rapidly exploit internees for actionable intelligence. MG
Miller's team focused on three areas: intelligence integration,
synchronization, and fusion; interrogation operations; and detention
operations. MG Miller's team used JTF-GTMO procedures and
interrogation authorities as baselines. (ANNEX 20)
7. (U) The Investigating Team began its inquiry with an in-depth analysis
of the Report on Detention and Corrections in Iraq, dated 5 November
2003, conducted by MG Ryder and a team of military police, legal,
medical, and automation experts. The CJTF-7 Commander, LTG Sanchez,
had previously requested a team of subject matter experts to assess,
and make specific recommendations concerning detention and
corrections operations. From 13 October to 6 November 2003, MG Ryder
personally led this assessment/assistance team in Iraq. (ANNEX 19)
ASSESSMENT OF DoD COUNTER-TERRORISM INTERROGATION AND
DETENTION OPERATIONS IN IRAQ (MG MILLER'S ASSESSMENT)
1. (S/NF) The principal focus of MG Miller's team was on the strategic
interrogation of detainees/internees in Iraq. Among its conclusions in its
Executive Summary were that CJTF-7 did not have authorities and
procedures in place to affect a unified strategy to detain, interrogate, and
report information from detainees/internees in Iraq. The Executive
Summary also stated that detention operations must act as an enabler for
interrogation. (ANNEX 20)
2. (S/NF) With respect to interrogation, MG Miller's Team recommended
that CJTF-7 dedicate and train a detention guard force subordinate to the
Joint Interrogation Debriefing Center (JIDC) Commander that "sets the
conditions for the successful interrogation and exploitation of
internees/detainees." Regarding Detention Operations, MG Miller's team
stated that the function of Detention Operations is to provide a safe,
secure, and humane environment that supports the expeditious collection
of intelligence. However, it also stated "it is essential that the guard force
be actively engaged in setting the conditions for successful exploitation
of the internees." (ANNEX 20)
3. (S/NF) MG Miller's team also concluded that Joint Strategic
Interrogation Operations (within CJTF-7) are hampered by lack of active
control of the internees within the detention environment. The Miller Team
also stated that establishment of the Theater Joint Interrogation and
Detention Center (JIDC) at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) will consolidate both
detention and strategic interrogation operations and result in synergy
between MP and MI resources and an integrated, synchronized, and
focused strategic interrogation effort. (ANNEX 20)
4. (S/NF) MG Miller's team also observed that the application of emerging
strategic interrogation strategies and techniques contain new approaches
and operational art. The Miller Team also concluded that a legal review
and recommendations on internee interrogation operations by a
dedicated Command Judge Advocate is required to maximize
interrogation effectiveness. (ANNEX 20)
IO COMMENTS ON MG MILLER'S ASSESSMENT
1. (S/NF) MG Miller's team recognized that they were using JTF-GTMO
operational procedures and interrogation authorities as baselines for its
observations and recommendations. There is a strong argument that the
intelligence value of detainees held at JTF-Guantanamo (GTMO) is
different than that of the detainees/internees held at Abu Ghraib (BCCF)
and other detention facilities in Iraq. Currently, there are a large number
of Iraqi criminals held at Abu Ghraib (BCCF). These are not believed to be
international terrorists or members of Al Qaida, Anser Al Islam, Taliban,
and other international terrorist organizations. (ANNEX 20)
2. (S/NF) The recommendations of MG Miller's team that the "guard force"
be actively engaged in setting the conditions for successful exploitation
of the internees would appear to be in conflict with the recommendations
of MG Ryder's Team and AR 190-8 that military police "do not participate
in military intelligence supervised interrogation sessions." The Ryder
Report concluded that the OEF template whereby military police actively
set the favorable conditions for subsequent interviews runs counter to the
smooth operation of a detention facility. (ANNEX 20)
REPORT ON DETENTION AND CORRECTIONS
IN IRAQ (MG RYDER'S REPORT)
1. (U) MG Ryder and his assessment team conducted a comprehensive
review of the entire detainee and corrections system in Iraq and provided
recommendations addressing each of the following areas as requested
by the Commander CJTF-7:
a. (U) Detainee and corrections system management
b. (U) Detainee management, including detainee movement, segregation,
and accountability
c. (U) Means of command and control of the detention and corrections
system
d. (U) Integration of military detention and corrections with the Coalition
Provisional Authority (CPA) and adequacy of plans for transition to an
Iraqi-run corrections system
e. (U) Detainee medical care and health management
f. (U) Detention facilities that meet required health, hygiene, and
sanitation standards
g. (U) Court integration and docket management for criminal detainees
h. (U) Detainee legal processing
i. (U) Detainee databases and records, including integration with law
enforcement and court databases (ANNEX 19)
2. (U) Many of the findings and recommendations of MG Ryder's team are
beyond the scope of this investigation. However, several important
findings are clearly relevant to this inquiry and are summarized below
(emphasis is added in certain areas):
A. (U) Detainee Management (including movement, segregation, and
accountability)
1. (U) There is a wide variance in standards and approaches at the
various detention facilities. Several Division/Brigade collection points
and US monitored Iraqi prisons had flawed or insufficiently detailed use
of force and other standing operating procedures or policies (e.g.
weapons in the facility, improper restraint techniques, detainee
management, etc.) Though, there were no military police units purposely
applying inappropriate confinement practices. (ANNEX 19)
2. (U) Currently, due to lack of adequate Iraqi facilities, Iraqi criminals
(generally Iraqi-on-Iraqi crimes) are detained with security internees
(generally Iraqi-on-Coalition offenses) and EPWs in the same facilities,
though segregated in different cells/compounds. (ANNEX 19)
3. (U) The management of multiple disparate groups of detained people in
a single location by members of the same unit invites confusion about
handling, processing, and treatment, and typically facilitates the transfer
of information between different categories of detainees. (ANNEX 19)
4. (U) The 800th MP (I/R) units did not receive Internment/Resettlement
(I/R) and corrections specific training during their mobilization period.
Corrections training is only on the METL of two MP (I/R) Confinement
Battalions throughout the Army, one currently serving in Afghanistan, and
elements of the other are at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait. MP units supporting
JTF-GTMO received ten days of training in detention facility operations, to
include two days of unarmed self-defense, training in interpersonal
communication skills, forced cell moves, and correctional officer safety.
(ANNEX 19)
B. (U) Means of Command and Control of the Detention and Corrections
System
1. (U) The 800th MP Brigade was originally task organized with eight
MP(I/R) Battalions consisting of both MP Guard and Combat Support
companies. Due to force rotation plans, the 800th redeployed two
Battalion HHCs in December 2003, the 115th MP Battalion and the 324th
MP Battalion. In December 2003, the 400th MP Battalion was relieved of
its mission and redeployed in January 2004. The 724thMP Battalion
redeployed on 11 February 2004 and the remainder is scheduled to
redeploy in March and April 2004. They are the 310th MP Battalion, 320th
MP Battalion, 530th MP Battalion, and 744th MP Battalion. The units that
remain are generally understrength, as Reserve Component units do not
have an individual personnel replacement system to mitigate medical
losses or the departure of individual Soldiers that have reached 24
months of Federal active duty in a five-year period. (ANNEX 19)
2. (U) The 800thMP Brigade (I/R) is currently a CFLCC asset, TACON to
CJTF-7 to conduct Internment/Resettlement (I/R) operations in Iraq. All
detention operations are conducted in the CJTF-7 AO; Camps Ganci,
Vigilant, Bucca, TSP Whitford, and a separate High Value Detention (HVD)
site. (ANNEX 19)
3. (U) The 800th MP Brigade has experienced challenges adapting its
task organizational structure, training, and equipment resources from a
unit designed to conduct standard EPW operations in the COMMZ
(Kuwait). Further, the doctrinally trained MP Soldier-to-detainee population
ratio and facility layout templates are predicated on a compliant,
self-disciplining EPW population, and not criminals or high-risk security
internees. (ANNEX 19)
4. (U) EPWs and Civilian Internees should receive the full protections of
the Geneva Conventions, unless the denial of these protections is due to
specifically articulated military necessity (e.g., no visitation to preclude
the direction of insurgency operations). (ANNEXES 19 and 24)
5. (U) AR 190-8, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian
Internees, and other Detainees, FM 3-19.40, Military Police Internment
and Resettlement Operations, and FM 34-52, Intelligence Interrogations,
require military police to provide an area for intelligence collection efforts
within EPW facilities. Military Police, though adept at passive collection
of intelligence within a facility, do not participate in Military Intelligence
supervised interrogation sessions. Recent intelligence collection in
support of Operation Enduring Freedom posited a template whereby
military police actively set favorable conditions for subsequent
interviews. Such actions generally run counter to the smooth operation of
a detention facility, attempting to maintain its population in a compliant
and docile state. The 800th MP Brigade has not been directed to change
its facility procedures to set the conditions for MI interrogations, nor
participate in those interrogations. (ANNEXES 19 and 21-23)
6. MG Ryder's Report also made the following, inter alia, near-term and
mid-term recommendations regarding the command and control of
detainees:
a. (U) Align the release process for security internees with DoD Policy.
The process of screening security internees should include intelligence
findings, interrogation results, and current threat assessment.
b. (U) Determine the scope of intelligence collection that will occur at
Camp Vigilant. Refurbish the Northeast Compound to separate the
screening operation from the Iraqi run Baghdad Central Correctional
Facility. Establish procedures that define the role of military police
Soldiers securing the compound, clearly separating the actions of the
guards from those of the military intelligence personnel.
c. (U) Consolidate all Security Internee Operations, except the MEK
security mission, under a single Military Police Brigade Headquarters for
OIF 2.
d. (U) Insist that all units identified to rotate into the Iraqi Theater of
Operations (ITO) to conduct internment and confinement operations in
support of OIF 2 be organic to CJTF-7. (ANNEX 19)
IO COMMENTS REGARDING MG RYDER'S REPORT
1. (U) The objective of MG Ryder's Team was to observe detention and
prison operations, identify potential systemic and human rights issues,
and provide near-term, mid-term, and long-term recommendations to
improve CJTF-7 operations and transition of the Iraqi prison system from
US military control/oversight to the Coalition Provisional Authority and
eventually to the Iraqi Government. The Findings and Recommendations
of MG Ryder's Team are thorough and precise and should be
implemented immediately. (ANNEX 19)
2. (U) Unfortunately, many of the systemic problems that surfaced during
MG Ryder's Team's assessment are the very same issues that are the
subject of this investigation. In fact, many of the abuses suffered by
detainees occurred during, or near to, the time of that assessment. As will
be pointed out in detail in subsequent portions of this report, I disagree
with the conclusion of MG Ryder's Team in one critical aspect, that being
its conclusion that the 800th MP Brigade had not been asked to change
its facility procedures to set the conditions for MI interviews. While
clearly the 800th MP Brigade and its commanders were not tasked to set
conditions for detainees for subsequent MI interrogations, it is obvious
from a review of comprehensive CID interviews of suspects and
witnesses that this was done at lower levels. (ANNEX 19)
3. (U) I concur fully with MG Ryder's conclusion regarding the effect of AR
190-8. Military Police, though adept at passive collection of intelligence
within a facility, should not participate in Military Intelligence supervised
interrogation sessions. Moreover, Military Police should not be involved
with setting "favorable conditions" for subsequent interviews. These
actions, as will be outlined in this investigation, clearly run counter to the
smooth operation of a detention facility. (ANNEX 19)
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIVE ACTIONS
1. (U) Following our review of MG Ryder's Report and MG Miller's Report,
my investigation team immediately began an in-depth review of all
available documents regarding the 800th MP Brigade. We reviewed in
detail the voluminous CID investigation regarding alleged detainee
abuses at detention facilities in Iraq, particularly the Abu Ghraib (BCCF)
Detention Facility. We analyzed approximately fifty witness statements
from military police and military intelligence personnel, potential
suspects, and detainees. We reviewed numerous photos and videos of
actual detainee abuse taken by detention facility personnel, which are
now in the custody and control of the US Army Criminal Investigation
Command and the CJTF-7 prosecution team. The photos and videos are
not contained in this investigation. We obtained copies of the 800th MP
Brigade roster, rating chain, and assorted internal investigations and
disciplinary actions involving that command for the past several months.
(All ANNEXES Reviewed by Investigation Team)
2. (U) In addition to military police and legal officers from the CFLCC PMO
and SJA Offices we also obtained the services of two individuals who are
experts in military police detention practices and training. These were
LTC Timothy Weathersbee, Commander, 705th MP Battalion, United
States Disciplinary Barracks, Fort Leavenworth, and SFC Edward
Baldwin, Senior Corrections Advisor, US Army Military Police School, Fort
Leonard Wood. I also requested and received the services of Col (Dr)
Henry Nelson, a trained US Air Force psychiatrist assigned to assist my
investigation team. (ANNEX 4)
3. (U) In addition to MG Ryder's and MG Miller's Reports, the team
reviewed numerous reference materials including the 12 October 2003
CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy, the AR 15-6
Investigation on Riot and Shootings at Abu Ghraib on 24 November 2003,
the 205thMI Brigade's Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE), facility
staff logs/journals and numerous records of AR 15-6 investigations and
Serious Incident Reports (SIRs) on detainee escapes/shootings and
disciplinary matters from the 800th MP Brigade. (ANNEXES 5-20, 37, 93,
and 94)
4. (U) On 2 February 2004, I took my team to Baghdad for a one-day
inspection of the Abu Ghraib Prison (BCCF) and the High Value Detainee
(HVD) Complex in order to become familiar with those facilities. We also
met with COL Jerry Mocello, Commander, 3rd MP Criminal Investigation
Group (CID), COL Dave Quantock, Commander, 16th MP Brigade, COL
Dave Phillips, Commander, 89th MP Brigade, and COL Ed Sannwaldt,
CJTF-7 Provost Marshal. On 7 February 2004, the team visited the Camp
Bucca Detention Facility to familiarize itself with the facility and operating
structure. In addition, on 6 and 7 February 2004, at Camp Doha, Kuwait,
we conducted extensive training sessions on approved detention
practices. We continued our preparation by reviewing the ongoing CID
investigation and were briefed by the Special Agent in Charge, CW2 Paul
Arthur. We refreshed ourselves on the applicable reference materials
within each team member's area of expertise, and practiced investigative
techniques. I met with the team on numerous occasions to finalize
appropriate witness lists, review existing witness statements, arrange
logistics, and collect potential evidence. We also coordinated with CJTF-7
to arrange witness attendance, force protection measures, and general
logistics for the team's move to Baghdad on 8 February 2004. (ANNEXES
4 and 25)
5. (U) At the same time, due to the Transfer of Authority on 1 February
2004 between III Corps and V Corps, and the upcoming demobilization of
the 800th MP Brigade Command, I directed that several critical witnesses
who were preparing to leave the theater remain at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait
until they could be interviewed (ANNEX 29). My team deployed to
Baghdad on 8 February 2004 and conducted a series of interviews with a
variety of witnesses (ANNEX 30). We returned to Camp Doha, Kuwait on
13 February 2004. On 14 and 15 February we interviewed a number of
witnesses from the 800th MP Brigade. On 17 February we returned to
Camp Bucca, Iraq to complete interviews of witnesses at that location.
From 18 February thru 28 February we collected documents, compiled
references, did follow-up interviews, and completed a detailed analysis of
the volumes of materials accumulated throughout our investigation. On
29 February we finalized our executive summary and out-briefing slides.
On 9 March we submitted the AR 15-6 written report with findings and
recommendations to the CFLCC Deputy SJA, LTC Mark Johnson, for a
legal sufficiency review. The out-brief to the appointing authority, LTG
McKiernan, took place on 3 March 2004. (ANNEXES 26 and 45-91)
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(PART ONE)
(U) The investigation should inquire into all of the facts and
circumstances surrounding recent allegations of detainee abuse,
specifically, allegations of maltreatment at the Abu Ghraib Prison
(Baghdad Central Confinement Facility).
1. (U) The US Army Criminal Investigation Command (CID), led by COL
Jerry Mocello, and a team of highly trained professional agents have
done a superb job of investigating several complex and extremely
disturbing incidents of detainee abuse at the Abu Ghraib Prison. They
conducted over 50 interviews of witnesses, potential criminal suspects,
and detainees. They also uncovered numerous photos and videos
portraying in graphic detail detainee abuse by Military Police personnel
on numerous occasions from October to December 2003. Several
potential suspects rendered full and complete confessions regarding
their personal involvement and the involvement of fellow Soldiers in this
abuse. Several potential suspects invoked their rights under Article 31 of
the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and the 5th Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution. (ANNEX 25)
2. (U) In addition to a comprehensive and exhaustive review of all of
these statements and documentary evidence, we also interviewed
numerous officers, NCOs, and junior enlisted Soldiers in the 800th MP
Brigade, as well as members of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade
working at the prison. We did not believe it was necessary to re-interview
all the numerous witnesses who had previously provided comprehensive
statements to CID, and I have adopted those statements for the purposes
of this investigation. (ANNEXES 26, 34, 35, and 45-91)
REGARDING PART ONE OF THE INVESTIGATION, I MAKE THE
FOLLOWING SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF FACT:
1. (U) That Forward Operating Base (FOB) Abu Ghraib (BCCF) provides
security of both criminal and security detainees at the Baghdad Central
Correctional Facility, facilitates the conducting of interrogations for
CJTF-7, supports other CPA operations at the prison, and enhances the
force protection/quality of life of Soldiers assigned in order to ensure the
success of ongoing operations to secure a free Iraq. (ANNEX 31)
2. (U) That the Commander, 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, was
designated by CJTF-7 as the Commander of FOB Abu Ghraib (BCCF)
effective 19 November 2003. That the 205th MI Brigade conducts
operational and strategic interrogations for CJTF-7. That from 19
November 2003 until Transfer of Authority (TOA) on 6 February 2004, COL
Thomas M. Pappas was the Commander of the 205th MI Brigade and the
Commander of FOB Abu Ghraib (BCCF). (ANNEX 31)
3. (U) That the 320th Military Police Battalion of the 800th MP Brigade is
responsible for the Guard Force at Camp Ganci, Camp Vigilant, &
Cellblock 1 of FOB Abu Ghraib (BCCF). That from February 2003 to until he
was suspended from his duties on 17 January 2004, LTC Jerry
Phillabaum served as the Battalion Commander of the 320th MP
Battalion. That from December 2002 until he was suspended from his
duties, on 17 January 2004, CPT Donald Reese served as the Company
Commander of the 372ndMP Company, which was in charge of guarding
detainees at FOB Abu Ghraib. I further find that both the 320th MP
Battalion and the 372ndMP Company were located within the confines of
FOB Abu Ghraib. (ANNEXES 32 and 45)
4. (U) That from July of 2003 to the present, BG Janis L. Karpinski was the
Commander of the 800th MP Brigade. (ANNEX 45)
5. (S) That between October and December 2003, at the Abu Ghraib
Confinement Facility (BCCF), numerous incidents of sadistic, blatant, and
wanton criminal abuses were inflicted on several detainees. This
systemic and illegal abuse of detainees was intentionally perpetrated by
several members of the military police guard force (372nd Military Police
Company, 320thMilitary Police Battalion, 800th MP Brigade), in Tier
(section) 1-A of the Abu Ghraib Prison (BCCF). The allegations of abuse
were substantiated by detailed witness statements (ANNEX 26) and the
discovery of extremely graphic photographic evidence. Due to the
extremely sensitive nature of these photographs and videos, the ongoing
CID investigation, and the potential for the criminal prosecution of several
suspects, the photographic evidence is not included in the body of my
investigation. The pictures and videos are available from the Criminal
Investigative Command and the CTJF-7 prosecution team. In addition to
the aforementioned crimes, there were also abuses committed by
members of the 325th MI Battalion, 205th MI Brigade, and Joint
Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC). Specifically, on 24 November
2003, SPC Luciana Spencer, 205th MI Brigade, sought to degrade a
detainee by having him strip and returned to cell naked. (ANNEXES 26
and 53)
6. (S) I find that the intentional abuse of detainees by military police
personnel included the following acts:
a. (S) Punching, slapping, and kicking detainees; jumping on their naked
feet;
b. (S) Videotaping and photographing naked male and female detainees;
c. (S) Forcibly arranging detainees in various sexually explicit positions
for photographing;
d. (S) Forcing detainees to remove their clothing and keeping them naked
for several days at a time;
e. (S) Forcing naked male detainees to wear women's underwear;
f. (S) Forcing groups of male detainees to masturbate themselves while
being photographed and videotaped;
g. (S) Arranging naked male detainees in a pile and then jumping on
them;
h. (S) Positioning a naked detainee on a MRE Box, with a sandbag on his
head, and attaching wires to his fingers, toes, and penis to simulate
electric torture;
i. (S) Writing "I am a Rapest" (sic) on the leg of a detainee alleged to have
forcibly raped a 15-year old fellow detainee, and then photographing him
naked;
j. (S) Placing a dog chain or strap around a naked detainee's neck and
having a female Soldier pose for a picture;
k. (S) A male MP guard having sex with a female detainee;
l. (S) Using military working dogs (without muzzles) to intimidate and
frighten detainees, and in at least one case biting and severely injuring a
detainee;
m. (S) Taking photographs of dead Iraqi detainees.
(ANNEXES 25 and 26)
7.(U) These findings are amply supported by written confessions
provided by several of the suspects, written statements provided by
detainees, and witness statements. In reaching my findings, I have
carefully considered the pre-existing statements of the following
witnesses and suspects (ANNEX 26):
a. (U) SPC Jeremy Sivits, 372nd MP Company - Suspect
b. (U) SPC Sabrina Harman, 372nd MP Company - Suspect
c. (U) SGT Javal S. Davis, 372nd MP Company - Suspect
c. (U) PFC Lynndie R. England, 372nd MP Company - Suspect
d. (U) Adel Nakhla, Civilian Translator, Titan Corp., Assigned to the 205th
MI Brigade- Suspect
(Names deleted)
8. (U) In addition, several detainees also described the following acts of
abuse, which under the circumstances, I find credible based on the clarity
of their statements and supporting evidence provided by other witnesses
(ANNEX 26):
a. (U) Breaking chemical lights and pouring the phosphoric liquid on
detainees;
b. (U) Threatening detainees with a charged 9mm pistol;
c. (U) Pouring cold water on naked detainees;
d. (U) Beating detainees with a broom handle and a chair;
e. (U) Threatening male detainees with rape;
f. (U) Allowing a military police guard to stitch the wound of a detainee
who was injured after being slammed against the wall in his cell;
g. (U) Sodomizing a detainee with a chemical light and perhaps a broom
stick.
h. (U) Using military working dogs to frighten and intimidate detainees
with threats of attack, and in one instance actually biting a detainee.
9. (U) I have carefully considered the statements provided by the
following detainees, which under the circumstances I find credible based
on the clarity of their statements and supporting evidence provided by
other witnesses:
a. (U) Amjed Isail Waleed, Detainee # 151365
b. (U) Hiadar Saber Abed Miktub-Aboodi, Detainee # 13077
c. (U) Huessin Mohssein Al-Zayiadi, Detainee # 19446
d. (U) Kasim Mehaddi Hilas, Detainee # 151108
e. (U) Mohanded Juma Juma (sic), Detainee # 152307
f. (U) Mustafa Jassim Mustafa, Detainee # 150542
g. (U) Shalan Said Alsharoni, Detainee, # 150422
h. (U) Abd Alwhab Youss, Detainee # 150425
i. (U) Asad Hamza Hanfosh, Detainee # 152529
j. (U) Nori Samir Gunbar Al-Yasseri, Detainee # 7787
k. (U) Thaar Salman Dawod, Detainee # 150427
l. (U) Ameen Sa'eed Al-Sheikh, Detainee # 151362
m. (U) Abdou Hussain Saad Faleh, Detainee # 18470 (ANNEX 26)
10. (U) I find that contrary to the provision of AR 190-8, and the findings
found in MG Ryder's Report, Military Intelligence (MI) interrogators and
Other US Government Agency's (OGA) interrogators actively requested
that MP guards set physical and mental conditions for favorable
interrogation of witnesses. Contrary to the findings of MG Ryder's Report,
I find that personnel assigned to the 372ndMP Company, 800th MP
Brigade were directed to change facility procedures to "set the
conditions" for MI interrogations. I find no direct evidence that MP
personnel actually participated in those MI interrogations. (ANNEXES 19,
21, 25, and 26).
11. (U) I reach this finding based on the actual proven abuse that I find
was inflicted on detainees and by the following witness statements.
(ANNEXES 25 and 26):
a. (U) SPC Sabrina Harman, 372nd MP Company, stated in her sworn
statement regarding the incident where a detainee was placed on a box
with wires attached to his fingers, toes, and penis, "that her job was to
keep detainees awake." She stated that MI was talking to CPL Grainer.
She stated: "MI wanted to get them to talk. It is Grainer and Frederick's
job to do things for MI and OGA to get these people to talk."
b. (U) SGT Javal S. Davis, 372nd MP Company, stated in his sworn
statement as follows: "I witnessed prisoners in the MI hold section, wing
1A being made to do various things that I would question morally. In
Wing 1A we were told that they had different rules and different SOP for
treatment. I never saw a set of rules or SOP for that section just word of
mouth. The Soldier in charge of 1A was Corporal Granier. He stated that
the Agents and MI Soldiers would ask him to do things, but nothing was
ever in writing he would complain (sic)." When asked why the rules in
1A/1B were different than the rest of the wings, SGT Davis stated: "The
rest of the wings are regular prisoners and 1A/B are Military Intelligence
(MI) holds." When asked why he did not inform his chain of command
about this abuse, SGT Davis stated: " Because I assumed that if they
were doing things out of the ordinary or outside the guidelines, someone
would have said something. Also the wing belongs to MI and it appeared
MI personnel approved of the abuse." SGT Davis also stated that he had
heard MI insinuate to the guards to abuse the inmates. When asked what
MI said he stated: "Loosen this guy up for us." Make sure he has abad
night." "Make sure he gets the treatment." He claimed these comments
were made to CPL Granier and SSG Frederick. Finally, SGT Davis stated
that (sic): "the MI staffs to my understanding have been giving Granier
compliments on the way he has been handling the MI holds. Example
being statements like, "Good job, they're breaking down real fast. They
answer every question. They're giving out good information, Finally, and
Keep up the good work . Stuff like that."
c. (U) SPC Jason Kennel, 372nd MP Company, was asked if he were
present when any detainees were abused. He stated: "I saw them nude,
but MI would tell us to take away their mattresses, sheets, and clothes."
He could not recall who in MI had instructed him to do this, but
commented that, "if they wanted me to do that they needed to give me
paperwork." He was later informed that "we could not do anything to
embarrass the prisoners."
d. (U) Mr. Adel L. Nakhla, a US civilian contract translator was questioned
about several detainees accused of rape. He observed (sic): "They
(detainees) were all naked, a bunch of people from MI, the MP were there
that night and the inmates were ordered by SGT Granier and SGT
Frederick ordered the guys while questioning them to admit what they
did. They made them do strange exercises by sliding on their stomach,
jump up and down, throw water on them and made them some wet, called
them all kinds of names such as "gays" do they like to make love to
guys, then they handcuffed their hands together and their legs with
shackles and started to stack them on top of each other by insuring that
the bottom guys penis will touch the guy on tops butt."
e. (U) SPC Neil A Wallin, 109th Area Support Medical Battalion, a medic
testified that: "Cell 1A was used to house high priority detainees and cell
1B was used to house the high risk or trouble making detainees. During
my tour at the prison I observed that when the male detainees were first
brought to the facility, some of them were made to wear female
underwear, which I think was to somehow break them down."
12. (U) I find that prior to its deployment to Iraq for Operation Iraqi
Freedom, the 320th MP Battalion and the 372nd MP Company had
received no training in detention/internee operations. I also find that very
little instruction or training was provided to MP personnel on the
applicable rules of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, FM 27-10, AR 190-8, or FM 3-19.40. Moreover, I find
that few, if any, copies of the Geneva Conventions were ever made
available to MP personnel or detainees. (ANNEXES 21-24, 33, and
multiple witness statements)
13.(U) Another obvious example of the Brigade Leadership not
communicating with its Soldiers or ensuring their tactical proficiency
concerns the incident of detainee abuse that occurred at Camp Bucca,
Iraq, on May 12, 2003. Soldiers from the 223rd MP Company reported to
the 800th MP Brigade Command at Camp Bucca, that four Military Police
Soldiers from the 320th MP Battalion had abused a number of detainees
during inprocessing at Camp Bucca. An extensive CID investigation
determined that four soldiers from the 320th MP Battalion had kicked and
beaten these detainees following a transport mission from Talil Air Base.
(ANNEXES 34 and 35)
14. (U) Formal charges under the UCMJ were preferred against these
Soldiers and an Article-32 Investigation conducted by LTC Gentry. He
recommended a general court martial for the four accused, which BG
Karpinski supported. Despite this documented abuse, there is no
evidence that BG Karpinski ever attempted to remind 800th MP Soldiers
of the requirements of the Geneva Conventions regarding detainee
treatment or took any steps to ensure that such abuse was not repeated.
Nor is there any evidence that LTC(P) Phillabaum, the commander of the
Soldiers involved in the Camp Bucca abuse incident, took any initiative to
ensure his Soldiers were properly trained regarding detainee treatment.
(ANNEXES 35 and 62)
RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO PART ONE OF THE INVESTIGATION:
1. (U) Immediately deploy to the Iraq Theater an integrated
multi-discipline Mobile Training Team (MTT) comprised of subject matter
experts in internment/resettlement operations, international and
operational law, information technology, facility management,
interrogation and intelligence gathering techniques, chaplains, Arab
cultural awareness, and medical practices as it pertains to I/R activities.
This team needs to oversee and conduct comprehensive training in all
aspects of detainee and confinement operations.
2. (U) That all military police and military intelligence personnel involved
in any aspect of detainee operations or interrogation operations in
CJTF-7, and subordinate units, be immediately provided with training by
an international/operational law attorney on the specific provisions of The
Law of Land Warfare FM 27-10, specifically the Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Enemy Prisoners of War,
Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees, and Other Detainees, and AR
190-8.
3. (U) That a single commander in CJTF-7 be responsible for overall
detainee operations throughout the Iraq Theater of Operations. I also
recommend that the Provost Marshal General of the Army assign a
minimum of two (2) subject matter experts, one officer and one NCO, to
assist CJTF-7 in coordinating detainee operations.
4. (U) That detention facility commanders and interrogation facility
commanders ensure that appropriate copies of the Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War and notice of protections be
made available in both English and the detainees' language and be
prominently displayed in all detention facilities. Detainees with questions
regarding their treatment should be given the full opportunity to read the
Convention.
5. (U) That each detention facility commander and interrogation facility
commander publish a complete and comprehensive set of Standing
Operating Procedures (SOPs) regarding treatment of detainees, and that
all personnel be required to read the SOPs and sign a document
indicating that they have read and understand the SOPs.
6. (U) That in accordance with the recommendations of MG Ryder's
Assessment Report, and my findings and recommendations in this
investigation, all units in the Iraq Theater of Operations conducting
internment/confinement/detainment operations in support of Operation
Iraqi Freedom be OPCON for all purposes, to include action under the
UCMJ, to CJTF-7.
7. (U) Appoint the C3, CJTF as the staff proponent for detainee operations
in the Iraq Joint Operations Area (JOA). (MG Tom Miller, C3, CJTF-7, has
been appointed by COMCJTF-7).
8. (U) That an inquiry UP AR 381-10, Procedure 15 be conducted to
determine the extent of culpability of Military Intelligence personnel,
assigned to the 205th MI Brigade and the Joint Interrogation and
Debriefing Center (JIDC) regarding abuse of detainees at Abu Ghraib
(BCCF).
9. (U) That it is critical that the proponent for detainee operations is
assigned a dedicated Senior Judge Advocate, with specialized training
and knowledge of international and operational law, to assist and advise
on matters of detainee operations.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(PART TWO)
(U) The Investigation inquire into detainee escapes and accountability
lapses as reported by CJTF-7, specifically allegations concerning these
events at the Abu Ghraib Prison:
REGARDING PART TWO OF THE INVESTIGATION,
I MAKE THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF FACT:
1. The 800th MP Brigade was responsible for theater-wide Internment and
Resettlement (I/R) operations. (ANNEXES 45 and 95)
2. (U) The 320th MP Battalion, 800th MP Brigade was tasked with
detainee operations at the Abu Ghraib Prison Complex during the time
period covered in this investigation. (ANNEXES 41, 45, and 59)
3. (U) The 310th MP Battalion, 800th MP Brigade was tasked with
detainee operations and Forward Operating Base (FOB) Operations at the
Camp Bucca Detention Facility until TOA on 26 February 2004. (ANNEXES
41 and 52)
4. (U) The 744th MP Battalion, 800th MP Brigade was tasked with
detainee operations and FOB Operations at the HVD Detention Facility
until TOA on 4 March 2004. (ANNEXES 41 and 55)
5. (U) The 530th MP Battalion, 800th MP Brigade was tasked with
detainee operations and FOB Operations at the MEK holding facility until
TOA on 15 March 2004. (ANNEXES 41 and 97)
6. (U) Detainee operations include accountability, care, and well being of
Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Person, Civilian Detainees, and Other
Detainees, as well as Iraqi criminal prisoners. (ANNEX 22)
7. (U) The accountability for detainees is doctrinally an MP task IAW FM
3-19.40. (ANNEX 22)
8. (U) There is a general lack of knowledge, implementation, and
emphasis of basic legal, regulatory, doctrinal, and command
requirements within the 800th MP Brigade and its subordinate units.
(Multiple witness statements in ANNEXES 45-91).
9. (U) The handling of detainees and criminal prisoners after
in-processing was inconsistent from detention facility to detention facility,
compound to compound, encampment to encampment, and even shift to
shift throughout the 800th MP Brigade AOR. (ANNEX 37)
10. (U) Camp Bucca, operated by the 310th MP Battalion, had a "Criminal
Detainee In-Processing SOP" and a "Training Outline" for transferring and
releasing detainees, which appears to have been followed. (ANNEXES 38
and 52)
11. (U) Incoming and outgoing detainees are being documented in the
National Detainee Reporting System (NDRS) and Biometric Automated
Toolset System (BATS) as required by regulation at all detention
facilities. However, it is underutilized and often does not give a "real
time" accurate picture of the detainee population due to untimely
updating. (ANNEX 56)
12. (U) There was a severe lapse in the accountability of detainees at the
Abu Ghraib Prison Complex. The 320th MP Battalion used a self-created
"change sheet" to document the transfer of a detainee from one location
to another. For proper accountability, it is imperative that these change
sheets be processed and the detainee manifest be updated within 24
hours of movement. At Abu Ghraib, this process would often take as long
as 4 days to complete. This lag-time resulted in inaccurate detainee
Internment Serial Number (ISN) counts, gross differences in the detainee
manifest and the actual occupants of an individual compound, and
significant confusion of the MP Soldiers. The 320th MP Battalion S-1, CPT
Theresa Delbalso, and the S-3, MAJ David DiNenna, explained that this
breakdown was due to the lack of manpower to process change sheets in
a timely manner. (ANNEXES 39 and 98)
13. (U) The 320th Battalion TACSOP requires detainee accountability at
least 4 times daily at Abu Ghraib. However, a detailed review of their
operational journals revealed that these accounts were often not done or
not documented by the unit. Additionally, there is no indication that
accounting errors or the loss of a detainee in the accounting process
triggered any immediate corrective action by the Battalion TOC. (ANNEX
44)
14. (U) There is a lack of standardization in the way the 320th MP
Battalion conducted physical counts of their detainees. Each compound
within a given encampment did their headcounts differently. Some
compounds had detainees line up in lines of 10, some had them sit in
rows, and some moved all the detainees to one end of the compound and
counted them as they passed to the other end of the compound. (ANNEX
98)
15. (U) FM 3-19.40 outlines the need for 2 roll calls (100% ISN band
checks) per day. The 320th MP Battalion did this check only 2 times per
week. Due to the lack of real-time updates to the system, these checks
were regularly inaccurate. (ANNEXES 22 and 98)
16. (U) The 800th MP Brigade and subordinate units adopted
non-doctrinal terms such as "band checks," "roll-ups," and "call-ups,"
which contributed to the lapses in accountability and confusion at the
soldier level. (Annexes 63, 88, and 98)
17. (U) Operational journals at the various compounds and the 320th
Battalion TOC contained numerous unprofessional entries and flippant
comments, which highlighted the lack of discipline within the unit. There
was no indication that the journals were ever reviewed by anyone in their
chain of command. (Annex 37)
18. (U) Accountability SOPs were not fully developed and standing
TACSOPs were widely ignored. Any SOPs that did exist were not trained
on, and were never distributed to the lowest level. Most procedures were
shelved at the unit TOC, rather than at the subordinate units and guards
mount sites. (Annexes 44, 67, 71, and 85)
19. (U) Accountability and facility operations SOPs lacked specificity,
implementation measures, and a system of checks and balances to
ensure compliance. (AnnexES 76 and 82)
20. (U) Basic Army Doctrine was not widely referenced or utilized to
develop the accountability practices throughout the 800th MP Brigade's
subordinate units. Daily processing, accountability, and detainee care
appears to have been made up as the operations developed with reliance
on, and guidance from, junior members of the unit who had civilian
corrections experience. (Annex 21)
21. (U) Soldiers were poorly prepared and untrained to conduct I/R
operations prior to deployment, at the mobilization site, upon arrival in
theater, and throughout their mission. (ANNEXES 62, 63, and 69)
22. (U) The documentation provided to this investigation identified 27
escapes or attempted escapes from the detention facilities throughout the
800th MP Brigade's AOR. Based on my assessment and detailed
analysis of the substandard accountability process maintained by the
800th MP Brigade, it is highly likely that there were several more
unreported cases of escape that were probably "written off" as
administrative errors or otherwise undocumented. 1LT Lewis Raeder,
Platoon Leader, 372nd MP Company, reported knowing about at least two
additional escapes (one from a work detail and one from a window) from
Abu Ghraib (BCCF) that were not documented. LTC Dennis McGlone,
Commander, 744th MP Battalion, detailed the escape of one detainee at
the High Value Detainee Facility who went to the latrine and then outran
the guards and escaped. Lastly, BG Janis Karpinski, Commander, 800th
MP Brigade, stated that there were more than 32 escapes from her
holding facilities, which does not match the number derived from the
investigation materials. (ANNEXES 5-10, 45, 55, and 71)
23. (U) The Abu Ghraib and Camp Bucca detention facilities are
significantly over their intended maximum capacity while the guard force
is undermanned and under resourced. This imbalance has contributed to
the poor living conditions, escapes, and accountability lapses at the
various facilities. The overcrowding of the facilities also limits the ability
to identify and segregate leaders in the detainee population who may be
organizing escapes and riots within the facility. (ANNEXES 6, 22, and 92)
24. (U) The screening, processing, and release of detainees who should
not be in custody takes too long and contributes to the overcrowding and
unrest in the detention facilities. There are currently three separate
release mechanisms in the theater-wide internment operations. First, the
apprehending unit can release a detainee if there is a determination that
their continued detention is not warranted. Secondly, a criminal detainee
can be released after it has been determined that the detainee has no
intelligence value, and that their release would not be detrimental to
society. BG Karpinski had signature authority to release detainees in this
second category. Lastly, detainees accused of committing "Crimes
Against the Coalition," who are held throughout the separate facilities in
the CJTF-7 AOR, can be released upon a determination that they are of no
intelligence value and no longer pose a significant threat to Coalition
Forces. The release process for this category of detainee is a screening
by the local US Forces Magistrate Cell and a review by a Detainee
Release Board consisting of BG Karpinski, COL Marc Warren, SJA,
CJTF-7, and MG Barbara Fast, C-2, CJTF-7. MG Fast is the "Detainee
Release Authority" for detainees being held for committing crimes
against the coalition. According to BG Karpinski, this category of detainee
makes up more than 60% of the total detainee population, and is the
fastest growing category. However, MG Fast, according to BG Karpinski,
routinely denied the board's recommendations to release detainees in
this category who were no longer deemed a threat and clearly met the
requirements for release. According to BG Karpinski, the extremely slow
and ineffective release process has significantly contributed to the
overcrowding of the facilities. (ANNEXES 40, 45, and 46)
25. (U) After Action Reviews (AARs) are not routinely being conducted after
an escape or other serious incident. No lessons learned seem to have
been disseminated to subordinate units to enable corrective action at the
lowest level. The Investigation Team requested copies of AARs, and none
were provided. (Multiple Witness Statements)
26. (U) Lessons learned (i.e. Findings and Recommendations from
various 15-6 Investigations concerning escapes and accountability
lapses) were rubber stamped as approved and ordered implemented by
BG Karpinski. There is no evidence that the majority of her orders
directing the implementation of substantive changes were ever acted
upon. Additionally, there was no follow-up by the command to verify the
corrective actions were taken. Had the findings and recommendations
contained within their own investigations been analyzed and actually
implemented by BG Karpinski, many of the subsequent escapes,
accountability lapses, and cases of abuse may have been prevented.
(ANNEXES 5-10)
27. (U) The perimeter lighting around Abu Ghraib and the detention facility
at Camp Bucca is inadequate and needs to be improved to illuminate
dark areas that have routinely become avenues of escape. (ANNEX 6)
28. (U) Neither the camp rules nor the provisions of the Geneva
Conventions are posted in English or in the language of the detainees at
any of the detention facilities in the 800th MP Brigade's AOR, even after
several investigations had annotated the lack of this critical requirement.
(Multiple Witness Statements and the Personal Observations of the
Investigation Team)
29. (U) The Iraqi guards at Abu Ghraib BCCF) demonstrate questionable
work ethics and loyalties, and are a potentially dangerous contingent
within the Hard-Site. These guards have furnished the Iraqi criminal
inmates with contraband, weapons, and information. Additionally, they
have facilitated the escape of at least one detainee. (ANNEX 8 and
26-SPC Polak's Statement)
30. (U) In general, US civilian contract personnel (Titan Corporation, CACI,
etc...), third country nationals, and local contractors do not appear to be
properly supervised within the detention facility at Abu Ghraib. During our
on-site inspection, they wandered about with too much unsupervised free
access in the detainee area. Having civilians in various outfits (civilian
and DCUs) in and about the detainee area causes confusion and may
have contributed to the difficulties in the accountability process and with
detecting escapes. (ANNEX 51, Multiple Witness Statements, and the
Personal Observations of the Investigation Team)
31. (U) SGM Marc Emerson, Operations SGM, 320th MP Battalion,
contended that the Detainee Rules of Engagement (DROE) and the
general principles of the Geneva Convention were briefed at every guard
mount and shift change on Abu Ghraib. However, none of our witnesses,
nor our personal observations, support his contention. I find that SGM
Emerson was not a credible witness. (ANNEXES 45, 80, and the Personal
Observations of the Investigation Team)
32. (U) Several interviewees insisted that the MP and MI Soldiers at Abu
Ghraib (BCCF) received regular training on the basics of detainee
operations; however, they have been unable to produce any verifying
documentation, sign-in rosters, or soldiers who can recall the content of
this training. (Annexes 59, 80, and the Absence of any Training Records)
33. (S/NF) The various detention facilities operated by the 800th MP
Brigade have routinely held persons brought to them by Other
Government Agencies (OGAs) without accounting for them, knowing their
identities, or even the reason for their detention. The Joint Interrogation
and Debriefing Center (JIDC) at Abu Ghraib called these detainees "ghost
detainees." On at least one occasion, the 320th MP Battalion at Abu
Ghraib held a handful of "ghost detainees" (6-8) for OGAs that they moved
around within the facility to hide them from a visiting International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) survey team. This maneuver was
deceptive, contrary to Army Doctrine, and in violation of international law.
(Annex 53)
34. (U) The following riots, escapes, and shootings have been
documented and reported to this Investigation Team. Although there is no
data from other missions of similar size and duration to compare the
number of escapes with, the most significant factors derived from these
reports are twofold. First, investigations and SIRs lacked critical data
needed to evaluate the details of each incident. Second, each
investigation seems to have pointed to the same types of deficiencies;
however, little to nothing was done to correct the problems and to
implement the recommendations as was ordered by BG Karpinski, nor
was there any command emphasis to ensure these deficiencies were
corrected:
a. (U) 4 June 03- This escape was mentioned in the 15-6 Investigation
covering the 13 June 03 escape, recapture, and shootings of detainees at
Camp Vigilant (320th MP Battalion). However, no investigation or
additional information was provided as requested by this investigation
team. (ANNEX 7)
b. (U) 9 June 03- Riot and shootings of five detainees at Camp Cropper.
(115th MP Battalion) Several detainees allegedly rioted after a detainee
was subdued by MPs of the 115th MP Battalion after striking a guard in
compound B of Camp Cropper. A 15-6 investigation by 1LT Magowan
(115th MP Battalion, Platoon Leader) concluded that a detainee had acted
up and hit an MP. After being subdued, one of the MPs took off his DCU
top and flexed his muscles to the detainees, which further escalated the
riot. The MPs were overwhelmed and the guards fired lethal rounds to
protect the life of the compound MPs, whereby 5 detainees were
wounded. Contributing factors were poor communications, no clear chain
of command, facility-obstructed views of posted guards, the QRF did not
have non-lethal equipment, and the SOP was inadequate and outdated.
(ANNEX 5)
c. (U) 12 June 03- Escape and recapture of detainee #8399, escape and
shooting of detainee # 7166, and attempted escape of an unidentified
detainee from Camp Cropper Holding Area (115th MP Battalion). Several
detainees allegedly made their escape in the nighttime hours prior to
0300. A 15-6 investigation by CPT Wendlandt (115th MP Battalion, S-2)
concluded that the detainees allegedly escaped by crawling under the
wire at a location with inadequate lighting. One detainee was stopped
prior to escape. An MP of the 115th MP Battalion search team recaptured
detainee # 8399, and detainee # 7166 was shot and killed by a Soldier
during the recapture process. Contributing factors were overcrowding,
poor lighting, and the nature of the hardened criminal detainees at that
location. It is of particular note that the command was informed at least
24 hours in advance of the upcoming escape attempt and started doing
amplified announcements in Arabic stating the camp rules. The
investigation pointed out that rules and guidelines were not posted in the
camps in the detainees' native languages. (ANNEX 6)
d. (U) 13 June 03- Escape and recapture of detainee # 8968 and the
shooting of eight detainees at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) (320th MP Battalion).
Several detainees allegedly attempted to escape at about 1400 hours
from the Camp Vigilant Compound, Abu Ghraib (BCCF). A 15-6
investigation by CPT Wyks (400th MP Battalion, S-1) concluded that the
detainee allegedly escaped by sliding under the wire while the tower
guard was turned in the other direction. This detainee was subsequently
apprehended by the QRF. At about 1600 the same day, 30-40 detainees
rioted and pelted three interior MP guards with rocks. One guard was
injured and the tower guards fired lethal rounds at the rioters injuring 7
and killing 1 detainee. (ANNEX 7)
e. (U) 05 November 03- Escape of detainees # 9877 and # 10739 from
Abu Ghraib (320th MP Battalion). Several detainees allegedly escaped at
0345 from the Hard-Site, Abu Ghraib (BCCF). An SIR was initiated by SPC
Warner (320th MP Battalion, S-3 RTO). The SIR indicated that 2 criminal
prisoners escaped through their cell window in tier 3A of the Hard-Site. No
information on findings, contributing factors, or corrective action has been
provided to this investigation team. (ANNEX 11)
f. (U) 07 November 03- Escape of detainee # 14239 from Abu Ghraib
(320th MP Battalion). A detainee allegedly escaped at 1330 from
Compound 2 of the Ganci Encampment, Abu Ghraib (BCCF). An SIR was
initiated by SSG Hydro (320th MP Battalion, S-3 Asst. NCOIC). The SIR
indicated that a detainee escaped from the North end of the compound
and was discovered missing during distribution of the noon meal, but
there is no method of escape listed in the SIR. No information on
findings, contributing factors, or corrective action has been provided to
this investigation team. (ANNEX 12)
g. (U) 08 November 03- Escape of detainees # 115089, # 151623, #
151624, # 116734, # 116735, and # 116738 from Abu Ghraib (320th MP
Battalion). Several detainees allegedly escaped at 2022 from Compound
8 of the Ganci encampment, Abu Ghraib. An SIR was initiated by MAJ
DiNenna (320th MP Battalion, S-3). The SIR indicated that 5-6 prisoners
escaped from the North end of the compound, but there is no method of
escape listed in the SIR. No information on findings, contributing factors,
or corrective action has been provided to this investigation team. (ANNEX
13)
h. (U) 24 November 03- Riot and shooting of 12 detainees # 150216,
#150894, #153096, 153165, #153169, #116361, #153399, #20257,
#150348, #152616, #116146, and #152156 at Abu Ghraib(320th MP
Battalion). Several detainees allegedly began to riot at about 1300 in all
of the compounds at the Ganci encampment. This resulted in the shooting
deaths of 3 detainees, 9 wounded detainees, and 9 injured US Soldiers. A
15-6 investigation by COL Bruce Falcone (220th MP Brigade, Deputy
Commander) concluded that the detainees rioted in protest of their living
conditions, that the riot turned violent, the use of non-lethal force was
ineffective, and, after the 320th MP Battalion CDR executed "Golden
Spike," the emergency containment plan, the use of deadly force was
authorized. Contributing factors were lack of comprehensive training of
guards, poor or non-existent SOPs, no formal guard-mount conducted
prior to shift, no rehearsals or ongoing training, the mix of less than
lethal rounds with lethal rounds in weapons, no AARs being conducted
after incidents, ROE not posted and not understood, overcrowding,
uniforms not standardized, and poor communication between the
command and Soldiers. (ANNEX 8)
i. (U) 24 November 03- Shooting of detainee at Abu Ghraib(320th MP
Battalion). A detainee allegedly had a pistol in his cell and around 1830
an extraction team shot him with less than lethal and lethal rounds in the
process of recovering the weapon. A 15-6 investigation by COL Bruce
Falcone (220th Brigade, Deputy Commander) concluded that one of the
detainees in tier 1A of the Hard Site had gotten a pistol and a couple of
knives from an Iraqi Guard working in the encampment. Immediately upon
receipt of this information, an ad-hoc extraction team consisting of MP
and MI personnel conducted what they called a routine cell search, which
resulted in the shooting of an MP and the detainee. Contributing factors
were a corrupt Iraqi Guard, inadequate SOPs, the Detention ROE in place
at the time was ineffective due to the numerous levels of authorization
needed for use of lethal force, poorly trained MPs, unclear lanes of
responsibility, and ambiguous relationship between the MI and MP
assets. (ANNEX 8)
j. (U) 13 December 03- Shooting by non-lethal means into crowd at Abu
Ghraib(320th MP Battalion). Several detainees allegedly got into a
detainee-on-detainee fight around 1030 in Compound 8 of the Ganci
encampment, Abu Ghraib. An SIR was initiated by SSG Matash (320th MP
Battalion, S-3 Section). The SIR indicated that there was a fight in the
compound and the MPs used a non-lethal crowd-dispersing round to
break up the fight, which was successful. No information on findings,
contributing factors, or corrective action has been provided to this
investigation team. (ANNEX 14)
k. (U) 13 December 03- Shooting by non-lethal means into crowd at Abu
Ghraib(320th MP Battalion). Several detainees allegedly got into a
detainee-on-detainee fight around 1120 in Compound 2 of the Ganci
encampment, Abu Ghraib. An SIR was initiated by SSG Matash (320th MP
Battalion, S-3 Section). The SIR indicated that there was a fight in the
compound and the MPs used two non-lethal shots to disperse the crowd,
which was successful. No information on findings, contributing factors, or
corrective action has been provided to this investigation team. (ANNEX
15)
l. (U) 13 December 03- Shooting by non-lethal means into crowd at Abu
Ghraib(320th MP Battalion). Approximately 30-40 detainees allegedly got
into a detainee-on-detainee fight around 1642 in Compound 3 of the Ganci
encampment, Abu Ghraib (BCCF). An SIR was initiated by SSG Matash
(320th MP Battalion, S-3 Section). The SIR indicates that there was a fight
in the compound and the MPs used a non-lethal crowd-dispersing round
to break up the fight, which was successful. No information on findings,
contributing factors, or corrective action has been provided to this
investigation team. (ANNEX 16)
m. (U) 17 December 03- Shooting by non-lethal means of detainee from
Abu Ghraib(320th MP Battalion). Several detainees allegedly assaulted
an MP at 1459 inside the Ganci Encampment, Abu Ghraib (BCCF). An SIR
was initiated by SSG Matash (320th MP BRIGADE, S-3 Section). The SIR
indicated that three detainees assaulted an MP, which resulted in the use
of a non-lethal shot that calmed the situation. No information on findings,
contributing factors, or corrective action has been provided to this
investigation team. (ANNEX 17)
n. (U) 07 January 04- Escape of detainee #115032 from Camp
Bucca(310th MP Battalion). A detainee allegedly escaped between the
hours of 0445 and 0640 from Compound 12, of Camp Bucca. Investigation
by CPT Kaires (310th MP Battalion S-3) and CPT Holsombeck (724th MP
Battalion S-3) concluded that the detainee escaped through an undetected
weakness in the wire. Contributing factors were inexperienced guards,
lapses in accountability, complacency, lack of leadership presence, poor
visibility, and lack of clear and concise communication between the
guards and the leadership. (ANNEX 9)
o. (U) 12 January 04- Escape of Detainees #115314 and #109950 as well
as the escape and recapture of 5 unknown detainees at the Camp Bucca
Detention Facility (310th MP Battalion). Several detainees allegedly
escaped around 0300 from Compound 12, of Camp Bucca. An AR 15-6
Investigation by LTC Leigh Coulter (800th MP Brigade, OIC Camp Arifjan
Detachment) concluded that three of the detainees escaped through the
front holding cell during conditions of limited visibility due to fog. One of
the detainees was noticed, shot with a non-lethal round, and returned to
his holding compound. That same night, 4 detainees exited through the
wire on the South side of the camp and were seen and apprehended by
the QRF. Contributing factors were the lack of a coordinated effort for
emplacement of MPs during implementation of the fog plan,
overcrowding, and poor communications. (ANNEX 10)
p. (U) 14 January 04- Escape of detainee #12436 and missing Iraqi guard
from Hard-Site, Abu Ghraib (320th MP Battalion). A detainee allegedly
escaped at 1335 from the Hard Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF). An SIR was
initiated by SSG Hydro (320th MP Battalion, S-3 Asst. NCOIC). The SIR
indicates that an Iraqi guard assisted a detainee to escape by signing
him out on a work detail and disappearing with him. At the time of the
second SIR, neither missing person had been located. No information on
findings, contributing factors, or corrective action has been provided to
this investigation team. (ANNEX 99)
q. (U) 26 January 04- Escape of detainees #s 115236, 116272, and
151933 from Camp Bucca(310th MP Battalion). Several Detainees
allegedly escaped between the hours of 0440 and 0700 during a period of
intense fog. Investigation by CPT Kaires (310th MP Battalion S-3)
concluded that the detainees crawled under a fence when visibility was
only 10-15 meters due to fog. Contributing factors were the limited
visibility (darkness under foggy conditions), lack of proper accountability
reporting, inadequate number of guards, commencement of detainee
feeding during low visibility operations, and poorly rested MPs. (ANNEX
18)
36. (U) As I have previously indicated, this investigation determined that
there was virtually a complete lack of detailed SOPs at any of the
detention facilities. Moreover, despite the fact that there were numerous
reported escapes at detention facilities throughout Iraq (in excess of 35),
AR 15-6 Investigations following these escapes were simply forgotten or
ignored by the Brigade Commander with no dissemination to other
facilities. After-Action Reports and Lessons Learned, if done at all,
remained at individual facilities and were not shared among other
commanders or soldiers throughout the Brigade. The Command never
issued standard TTPs for handling escape incidents. (AnnexES 5-10,
Multiple Witness Statements, and the Personal Observations of the
Investigation Team)
RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING PART TWO OF THE INVESTIGATION:
(U) ANNEX 100 of this investigation contains a detailed and referenced
series of recommendations for improving the detainee accountability
practices throughout the OIF area of operations. (U) Accountability
practices throughout any particular detention facility must be
standardized and in accordance with applicable regulations and
international law. (U) The NDRS and BATS accounting systems must be
expanded and used to their fullest extent to facilitate real time updating
when detainees are moved and or transferred from one location to
another. (U) "Change sheets," or their doctrinal equivalent must be
immediately processed and updated into the system to ensure accurate
accountability. The detainee roll call or ISN counts must match the
manifest provided to the compound guards to ensure proper
accountability of detainees. (U) Develop, staff, and implement
comprehensive and detailed SOPs utilizing the lessons learned from this
investigation as well as any previous findings, recommendations, and
reports. (U) SOPs must be written, disseminated, trained on, and
understood at the lowest level.(U) Iraqi criminal prisoners must be held in
separate facilities from any other category of detainee. (U) All of the
compounds should be wired into the master manifest whereby MP
Soldiers can account for their detainees in real time and without waiting
for their change sheets to be processed. This would also have the
change sheet serve as a way to check up on the accuracy of the manifest
as updated by each compound. The BATS and NDRS system can be
utilized for this function.(U) Accountability lapses, escapes, and
disturbances within the detainment facilities must be immediately
reported through both the operational and administrative Chain of
Command via a Serious Incident Report (SIR). The SIRs must then be
tracked and followed by daily SITREPs until the situation is resolved. (U)
Detention Rules of Engagement (DROE), Interrogation Rules of
Engagement (IROE), and the principles of the Geneva Conventions need
to be briefed at every shift change and guard mount. (U) AARs must be
conducted after serious incidents at any given facility. The observations
and corrective actions that develop from the AARs must be analyzed by
the respective MP Battalion S-3 section, developed into a plan of action,
shared with the other facilities, and implemented as a matter of policy. (U)
There must be significant structural improvements at each of the
detention facilities. The needed changes include significant enhancement
of perimeter lighting, additional chain link fencing, staking down of all
concertina wire, hard site development, and expansion of Abu Ghraib
(BCCF) . (U) The Geneva Conventions and the facility rules must be
prominently displayed in English and the language of the detainees at
each compound and encampment at every detention facility IAW AR
190-8. (U) Further restrict US civilians and other contractors' access
throughout the facility. Contractors and civilians must be in an authorized
and easily identifiable uniform to be more easily distinguished from the
masses of detainees in civilian clothes. (U) Facilities must have a stop
movement/transfer period of at least 1 hour prior to every 100% detainee
roll call and ISN counts to ensure accurate accountability.(U) The method
for doing head counts of detainees within a given compound must be
standardized. (U) Those military units conducting I/R operations must
know of, train on, and constantly reference the applicable Army Doctrine
and CJTF command policies. The references provided in this report cover
nearly every deficiency I have enumerated. Although they do not, and
cannot, make up for leadership shortfalls, all soldiers, at all levels, can
use them to maintain standardized operating procedures and efficient
accountability practices.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(PART THREE)
(U) Investigate the training, standards, employment, command policies,
internal procedures, and command climate in the 800th MP Brigade, as
appropriate:
(Names deleted)
(ANNEXES 45-91)
REGARDING PART THREE OF THE INVESTIGATION, I MAKE THE
FOLLOWING SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF FACT:
1. (U) I find that BG Janis Karpinski took command of the 800th MP
Brigade on 30 June 2003 from BG Paul Hill. BG Karpinski has remained
in command since that date. The 800th MP Brigade is comprised of eight
MP battalions in the Iraqi TOR: 115th MP Battalion, 310th MP Battalion,
320th MP Battalion, 324th MP Battalion, 400th MP Battalion, 530th MP
Battalion, 724th MP Battalion, and 744th MP Battalion.
(ANNEXES 41 and 45)
2. (U) Prior to BG Karpinski taking command, members of the 800th MP
Brigade believed they would be allowed to go home when all the
detainees were released from the Camp Bucca Theater Internment
Facility following the cessation of major ground combat on 1 May 2003. At
one point, approximately 7,000 to 8,000 detainees were held at Camp
Bucca. Through Article-5 Tribunals and a screening process, several
thousand detainees were released. Many in the command believed they
would go home when the detainees were released. In late May-early June
2003 the 800th MPBrigade was given a new mission to manage the Iraqi
penal system and several detention centers. This new mission meant
Soldiers would not redeploy to CONUS when anticipated. Morale suffered,
and over the next few months there did not appear to have been any
attempt by the Command to mitigate this morale problem. (ANNEXES 45
and 96)
3. (U) There is abundant evidence in the statements of numerous
witnesses that soldiers throughout the 800th MP Brigade were not
proficient in their basic MOS skills, particularly regarding
internment/resettlement operations. Moreover, there is no evidence that
the command, although aware of these deficiencies, attempted to correct
them in any systemic manner other than ad hoc training by individuals
with civilian corrections experience. (Multiple Witness Statements and
the Personal Observations of the Investigation Team)
4. (U) I find that the 800th MP Brigade was not adequately trained for a
mission that included operating a prison or penal institution at Abu Ghraib
Prison Complex. As the Ryder Assessment found, I also concur that units
of the 800th MP Brigade did not receive corrections-specific training
during their mobilization period. MP units did not receive pinpoint
assignments prior to mobilization and during the post mobilization
training, and thus could not train for specific missions. The training that
was accomplished at the mobilization sites were developed and
implemented at the company level with little or no direction or
supervision at the Battalion and Brigade levels, and consisted primarily
of common tasks and law enforcement training. However, I found no
evidence that the Command, although aware of this deficiency, ever
requested specific corrections training from the Commandant of the
Military Police School, the US Army Confinement Facility at Mannheim,
Germany, the Provost Marshal General of the Army, or the US Army
Disciplinary Barracks at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. (ANNEXES 19 and 76)
5. (U) I find that without adequate training for a civilian internee detention
mission, Brigade personnel relied heavily on individuals within the
Brigade who had civilian corrections experience, including many who
worked as prison guards or corrections officials in their civilian jobs.
Almost every witness we interviewed had no familiarity with the
provisions of AR 190-8 or FM 3-19.40. It does not appear that a Mission
Essential Task List (METL) based on in-theater missions was ever
developed nor was a training plan implemented throughout the Brigade.
(ANNEXES 21, 22, 67, and 81)
6. (U) I also find, as did MG Ryder's Team, that the 800th MP Brigade as
a whole, was understrength for the mission for which it was tasked. Army
Doctrine dictates that an I/R Brigade can be organized with between 7
and 21 battalions, and that the average battalion size element should be
able to handle approximately 4000 detainees at a time. This investigation
indicates that BG Karpinski and her staff did a poor job allocating
resources throughout the Iraq JOA. Abu Ghraib (BCCF) normally housed
between 6000 and 7000 detainees, yet it was operated by only one
battalion. In contrast, the HVD Facility maintains only about 100
detainees, and is also run by an entire battalion. (ANNEXES 19, 22, and
96)
7. (U) Reserve Component units do not have an individual replacement
system to mitigate medical or other losses. Over time, the 800th MP
Brigade clearly suffered from personnel shortages through release from
active duty (REFRAD) actions, medical evacuation, and demobilization. In
addition to being severely undermanned, the quality of life for Soldiers
assigned to Abu Ghraib (BCCF) was extremely poor. There was no DFAC,
PX, barbershop, or MWR facilities. There were numerous mortar attacks,
random rifle and RPG attacks, and a serious threat to Soldiers and
detainees in the facility. The prison complex was also severely
overcrowded and the Brigade lacked adequate resources and personnel
to resolve serious logistical problems. Finally, because of past
associations and familiarity of Soldiers within the Brigade, it appears that
friendship often took precedence over appropriate leader and subordinate
relationships. (ANNEX 101, Multiple Witness Statements, and the
Personal Observations of the Investigation Team)
8. (U) With respect to the 800th MP Brigade mission at Abu Ghraib
(BCCF), I find that there was clear friction and lack of effective
communication between the Commander, 205th MI Brigade, who
controlled FOB Abu Ghraib (BCCF) after 19 November 2003, and the
Commander, 800th MP Brigade, who controlled detainee operations
inside the FOB. There was no clear delineation of responsibility between
commands, little coordination at the command level, and no integration of
the two functions. Coordination occurred at the lowest possible levels
with little oversight by commanders. (ANNEXES 31, 45, and 46)
9. (U) I find that this ambiguous command relationship was exacerbated
by a CJTF-7 Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) 1108 issued on 19 November
2003. Paragraph 3.C.8, Assignment of 205th MI Brigade Commander's
Responsibilities for the Baghdad Central Confinement Facility, states as
follows:
3.C.8. A. (U) 205 MI BRIGADE.
3.C.8. A. 1. (U) EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY COMMANDER 205 MI BRIGADE
ASSUMES RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE BAGHDAD CONFINEMENT
FACILITY (BCCF) AND IS APPOINTED THE FOB COMMANDER. UNITS
CURRENTLY AT ABU GHRAIB (BCCF) ARE TACON TO 205 MI BRIGADE
FOR "SECURITY OF DETAINEES AND FOB PROTECTION."
Although not supported by BG Karpinski, FRAGO 1108 made all of the MP
units at Abu Ghraib TACON to the Commander, 205th MI Brigade. This
effectively made an MI Officer, rather than an MP Officer, responsible for
the MP units conducting detainee operations at that facility. This is not
doctrinally sound due to the different missions and agendas assigned to
each of these respective specialties. (ANNEX 31)
10 (U) Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), 10 July
2001 defines Tactical Control (TACON) as the detailed direction and
control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area
necessary to accomplish assigned missions or tasks. (ANNEX 42)
"TACON is the command authority over assigned or attached forces or
commands or military capability made available for tasking that is limited
to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within
the operational area necessary to accomplish assigned missions or
tasks. TACON is inherent in OPCON and may be delegated to and
exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of
combatant commander."
11. (U) Based on all the facts and circumstances in this investigation, I
find that there was little, if any, recognition of this TACON Order by the
800th MP Brigade or the 205th MI Brigade. Further, there was no
evidence if the Commander, 205th MI Brigade clearly informed the
Commander, 800th MP Brigade, and specifically the Commander, 320th
MP Battalion assigned at Abu Ghraib (BCCF), on the specific
requirements of this TACON relationship. (ANNEXES 45 and 46)
12. (U) It is clear from a comprehensive review of witness statements and
personal interviews that the 320th MP Battalion and 800th MP Brigade
continued to function as if they were responsible for the security, health
and welfare, and overall security of detainees within Abu Ghraib (BCCF)
prison. Both BG Karpinski and COL Pappas clearly behaved as if this
were still the case. (ANNEXES 45 and 46)
13. (U) With respect to the 320th MP Battalion, I find that the Battalion
Commander, LTC (P) Jerry Phillabaum, was an extremely ineffective
commander and leader. Numerous witnesses confirm that the Battalion
S-3, MAJ David W. DiNenna, basically ran the battalion on a day-to-day
basis. At one point, BG Karpinski sent LTC (P) Phillabaum to Camp
Arifjan, Kuwait for approximately two weeks, apparently to give him some
relief from the pressure he was experiencing as the 320th Battalion
Commander. This movement to Camp Arifjan immediately followed a
briefing provided by LTC (P) Phillabaum to the CJTF-7 Commander, LTG
Sanchez, near the end of October 2003. BG Karpinski placed LTC Ronald
Chew, Commander of the 115th MP Battalion, in charge of the 320th MP
Battalion for a period of approximately two weeks. LTC Chew was also in
command of the 115th MP Battalion assigned to Camp Cropper, BIAP,
Iraq. I could find no orders, either suspending or relieving LTC (P)
Phillabaum from command, nor any orders placing LTC Chew in
command of the 320th. In addition, there was no indication this removal
and search for a replacement was communicated to the Commander
CJTF-7, the Commander 377th TSC, or to Soldiers in the 320th MP
Battalion. Temporarily removing one commander and replacing him with
another serving Battalion Commander without an order and without
notifying superior or subordinate commands is without precedent in my
military career. LTC (P) Phillabaum was also reprimanded for lapses in
accountability that resulted in several escapes. The 320th MP Battalion
was stigmatized as a unit due to previous detainee abuse which occurred
in May 2003 at the Bucca Theater Internment Facility (TIF), while under
the command of LTC (P) Phillabaum. Despite his proven deficiencies as
both a commander and leader, BG Karpinski allowed LTC (P) Phillabaum
to remain in command of her most troubled battalion guarding, by far, the
largest number of detainees in the 800th MP Brigade. LTC (P) Phillabaum
was suspended from his duties by LTG Sanchez, CJTF-7 Commander on
17 January 2004. (ANNEXES 43, 45, and 61)
14. (U) During the course of this investigation I conducted a lengthy
interview with BG Karpinski that lasted over four hours, and is included
verbatim in the investigation Annexes. BG Karpinski was extremely
emotional during much of her testimony. What I found particularly
disturbing in her testimony was her complete unwillingness to either
understand or accept that many of the problems inherent in the 800th MP
Brigade were caused or exacerbated by poor leadership and the refusal
of her command to both establish and enforce basic standards and
principles among its soldiers. (ANNEX 45 and the Personal Observations
of the Interview Team)
15. (U) BG Karpinski alleged that she received no help from the Civil
Affairs Command, specifically, no assistance from either BG John Kern or
COL Tim Regan. She blames much of the abuse that occurred in Abu
Ghraib (BCCF) on MI personnel and stated that MI personnel had given
the MPs "ideas" that led to detainee abuse. In addition, she blamed the
372nd Company Platoon Sergeant, SFC Snider, the Company
Commander, CPT Reese, and the First Sergeant, MSG Lipinski, for the
abuse. She argued that problems in Abu Ghraib were the fault of COL
Pappas and LTC Jordan because COL Pappas was in charge of FOB Abu
Ghraib. (ANNEX 45)
16. (U) BG Karpinski also implied during her testimony that the criminal
abuses that occurred at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) might have been caused by
the ultimate disposition of the detainee abuse cases that originally
occurred at Camp Bucca in May 2003. She stated that "about the same
time those incidents were taking place out of Baghdad Central, the
decisions were made to give the guilty people at Bucca plea bargains.
So, the system communicated to the soldiers, the worst that's gonna
happen is, you're gonna go home." I think it important to point out that
almost every witness testified that the serious criminal abuse of
detainees at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) occurred in late October and early
November 2003. The photographs and statements clearly support that the
abuses occurred during this time period. The Bucca cases were set for
trial in January 2004 and were not finally disposed of until 29 December
2003. There is entirely no evidence that the decision of numerous MP
personnel to intentionally abuse detainees at Abu Ghrabid (BCCF) was
influenced in any respect by the Camp Bucca cases. (ANNEXES 25, 26,
and 45)
17. (U) Numerous witnesses stated that the 800th MP Brigade S-1, MAJ
Hinzman and S-4, MAJ Green, were essentially dysfunctional, but that
despite numerous complaints, these officers were not replaced. This had
a detrimental effect on the Brigade Staff's effectiveness and morale.
Moreover, the Brigade Command Judge Advocate, LTC James O'Hare,
appears to lack initiative and was unwilling to accept responsibility for
any of his actions. LTC Gary Maddocks, the Brigade XO did not properly
supervise the Brigade staff by failing to lay out staff priorities, take overt
corrective action when needed, and supervise their daily functions.
(ANNEXES 45, 47, 48, 62, and 67)
18. (U) In addition to poor morale and staff inefficiencies, I find that the
800th MP Brigade did not articulate or enforce clear and basic Soldier
and Army standards. I specifically found these examples of unenforced
standards:
a. There was no clear uniform standard for any MP Soldiers assigned
detention duties. Despite the fact that hundreds of former Iraqi soldiers
and officers were detainees, MP personnel were allowed to wear civilian
clothes in the FOB after duty hours while carrying weapons. (ANNEXES
51 and 74)
b. Some Soldiers wrote poems and other sayings on their helmets and
soft caps. (ANNEXES 51 and 74)
c. In addition, numerous officers and senior NCOs have been
reprimanded/disciplined for misconduct during this period. Those
disciplined include; (ANNEXES 43 and 102)
1). (U) BG Janis Karpinski, Commander, 800th MP Brigade
* Memorandum of Admonishment by LTG Sanchez, Commander, CJTF-7,
on 17 January 2004.
2). (U) LTC (P) Jerry Phillabaum, Commander, 320th MP Battalion
* GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, on 10
November 2003, for lack of leadership and for failing to take corrective
security measures as ordered by the Brigade Commander; filed locally *
Suspended by BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, 17 January
2004; Pending Relief for Cause, for dereliction of duty
3). (U) LTC Dale Burtyk, Commander, 400th MP Battalion
* GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, on 20
August 2003, for failure to properly train his Soldiers. (Soldier had
negligent discharge of M-16 while exiting his vehicle, round went into fuel
tank); filed locally.
4). (U) MAJ David DiNenna, S-3, 320th MP Battalion
* GOMOR from LTG McKiernan, Commander CFLCC, on 25 May 2003, for
dereliction of duty for failing to report a violation of CENTCOM General
Order #1 by a subordinate Field Grade Officer and Senior
Noncommissioned Officer, which he personally observed; returned to
soldier unfiled. * GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP
Brigade, on 10 November 03, for failing to take corrective security
measures as ordered by the Brigade Commander; filed locally.
5). (U) MAJ Stacy Garrity, Finance Officer, 800th MP Brigade
* GOMOR from LTG McKiernan, Commander CFLCC, on 25 May 2003, for
violation of CENTCOM General Order #1, consuming alcohol with an NCO;
filed locally.
6). (U) CPT Leo Merck, Commander, 870th MP Company
* Court-Martial Charges Preferred, for Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and
Unauthorized Use of Government Computer in that he was alleged to
have taken nude pictures of his female Soldiers without their knowledge;
Trial date to be announced.
7). (U) CPT Damaris Morales, Commander, 770th MP Company
* GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, on 20
August 2003, for failing to properly train his Soldiers (Soldier had
negligent discharge of M-16 while exiting his vehicle, round went into fuel
tank); filed locally.
8). (U) CSM Roy Clement, Command Sergeant Major, 800th MP Brigade
. GOMOR and Relief for Cause from BG Janis Karpinski, Commander
800th MP Brigade, for fraternization and dereliction of duty for
fraternizing with junior enlisted soldiers within his unit; GOMOR officially
filed and he was removed from the CSM list.
9). (U) CSM Edward Stotts, Command Sergeant Major, 400th MP Battalion
* GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, on 20
August 2003, for failing to properly train his Soldiers (Soldier had
negligent discharge of M-16 while exiting his vehicle, round went into fuel
tank); filed locally.
10). (U) 1SG Carlos Villanueva, First Sergeant, 770th MP Company
* GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, on 20
August 2003, for failing to properly train his Soldiers (Soldier had
negligent discharge of M-16 while exiting his vehicle, round went into fuel
tank); filed locally.
11). (U) MSG David Maffett, NBC NCO, 800th MP Brigade,
* GOMOR from LTG McKiernan, Commander CFLCC, on 25 May 2003, for
violation of CENTCOM General Order #1, consuming alcohol; filed locally.
12) (U) SGM Marc Emerson, Operations SGM, 320th MP Battalion,
. Two GO Letters of Concern and a verbal reprimand from BG Karpinski,
Commander 800th MP Brigade, for failing to adhere to the
guidance/directives given to him by BG Karpinski; filed locally.
d. (U) Saluting of officers was sporadic and not enforced. LTC Robert P.
Walters, Jr., Commander of the 165th Military Intelligence Battalion
(Tactical Exploitation), testified that the saluting policy was enforced by
COL Pappas for all MI personnel, and that BG Karpinski approached COL
Pappas to reverse the saluting policy back to a no-saluting policy as
previously existed. (ANNEX 53)
19. (U) I find that individual Soldiers within the 800th MP Brigade and the
320th Battalion stationed throughout Iraq had very little contact during
their tour of duty with either LTC (P) Phillabaum or BG Karpinski. BG
Karpinski claimed, during her testimony, that she paid regular visits to
the various detention facilities where her Soldiers were stationed.
However, the detailed calendar provided by her Aide-de-Camp, 1LT
Mabry, does not support her contention. Moreover, numerous witnesses
stated that they rarely saw BG Karpinski or LTC (P) Phillabaum. (Multiple
Witness Statements)
20. (U) In addition I find that psychological factors, such as the difference
in culture, the Soldiers' quality of life, the real presence of mortal danger
over an extended time period, and the failure of commanders to
recognize these pressures contributed to the perversive atmosphere that
existed at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) Detention Facility and throughout the 800th
MP Brigade. (ANNEX 1).
21. As I have documented in other parts of this investigation, I find that
there was no clear emphasis by BG Karpinski to ensure that the 800th
MP Brigade Staff, Commanders, and Soldiers were trained to standard in
detainee operations and proficiency or that serious accountability lapses
that occurred over a significant period of time, particularly at Abu Ghraib
(BCCF), were corrected. AR 15-6 Investigations regarding detainee
escapes were not acted upon, followed up with corrective action, or
disseminated to subordinate commanders or Soldiers. Brigade and unit
SOPs for dealing with detainees if they existed at all, were not read or
understood by MP Soldiers assigned the difficult mission of detainee
operations. Following the abuse of several detainees at Camp Bucca in
May 2003, I could find no evidence that BG Karpinski ever directed
corrective training for her soldiers or ensured that MP Soldiers
throughout Iraq clearly understood the requirements of the Geneva
Conventions relating to the treatment of detainees. (Multiple Witness
Statements and the Personal Observations of the Investigation Team )
22. On 17 January 2004 BG Karpinski was formally admonished in writing
by LTG Sanchez regarding the serious deficiencies in her Brigade. LTG
Sanchez found that the performance of the 800th MP Brigade had not met
the standards set by the Army or by CJTF-7. He found that incidents in the
preceding six months had occurred that reflected a lack of clear
standards, proficiency and leadership within the Brigade. LTG Sanchez
also cited the recent detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) as the most
recent example of a poor leadership climate that "permeates the
Brigade." I totally concur with LTG Sanchez' opinion regarding the
performance of BG Karpinski and the 800th MP Brigade. (ANNEX 102 and
the Personal Observations of the Investigating Officer)
RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO PART THREE OF THE INVESTIGATION:
1. (U) That BG Janis L. Karpinski, Commander, 800th MP Brigade be
Relieved from Command and given a General Officer Memorandum of
Reprimand for the following acts which have been previously referred to
in the aforementioned findings:
* Failing to ensure that MP Soldiers at theater-level detention facilities
throughout Iraq had appropriate SOPs for dealing with detainees and that
Commanders and Soldiers had read, understood, and would adhere to
these SOPs. * Failing to ensure that MP Soldiers in the 800th MP Brigade
knew, understood, and adhered to the protections afforded to detainees in
the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. *
Making material misrepresentations to the Investigation Team as to the
frequency of her visits to her subordinate commands. * Failing to obey an
order from the CFLCC Commander, LTG McKiernan, regarding the
withholding of disciplinary authority for Officer and Senior
Noncommissioned Officer misconduct. * Failing to take appropriate action
regarding the ineffectiveness of a subordinate Commander, LTC (P) Jerry
Phillabaum. * Failing to take appropriate action regarding the
ineffectiveness of numerous members of her Brigade Staff including her
XO, S-1, S-3, and S-4. * Failing to properly ensure the results and
recommendations of the AARs and numerous 15-6 Investigation reports
on escapes and shootings (over a period of several months) were
properly disseminated to, and understood by, subordinate commanders.
* Failing to ensure and enforce basic Soldier standards throughout her
command. * Failing to establish a Brigade METL. * Failing to establish
basic proficiency in assigned tasks for Soldiers throughout the 800th MP
Brigade. * Failing to ensure that numerous and reported accountability
lapses at detention facilities throughout Iraq were corrected.
2. (U) That COL Thomas M. Pappas, Commander, 205th MI Brigade, be
given a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand and Investigated UP
Procedure 15, AR 381-10, US Army Intelligence Activities for the following
acts which have been previously referred to in the aforementioned
findings:
* Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct command were properly
trained in and followed the IROE. * Failing to ensure that Soldiers under
his direct command knew, understood, and followed the protections
afforded to detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment
of Prisoners of War. * Failing to properly supervise his soldiers working
and "visiting" Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
3. (U) That LTC (P) Jerry L. Phillabaum, Commander, 320th MP Battalion,
be Relieved from Command, be given a General Officer Memorandum of
Reprimand, and be removed from the Colonel/O-6 Promotion List for the
following acts which have been previously referred to in the
aforementioned findings:
* Failing to properly ensure the results, recommendations, and AARs from
numerous reports on escapes and shootings over a period of several
months were properly disseminated to, and understood by, subordinates.
* Failing to implement the appropriate recommendations from various
15-6 Investigations as specifically directed by BG Karpinski. * Failing to
ensure that Soldiers under his direct command were properly trained in
Internment and Resettlement Operations. * Failing to ensure that Soldiers
under his direct command knew and understood the protections afforded
to detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War. * Failing to properly supervise his soldiers working
and "visiting" Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF). * Failing to
properly establish and enforce basic soldier standards, proficiency, and
accountability. * Failure to conduct an appropriate Mission Analysis and
to task organize to accomplish his mission.
4. (U) That LTC Steven L. Jordan, Former Director, Joint Interrogation and
Debriefing Center and Liaison Officer to 205th Military Intelligence
Brigade, be relieved from duty and be given a General Officer
Memorandum of Reprimand for the following acts which have been
previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:
* Making material misrepresentations to the Investigating Team,
including his leadership roll at Abu Ghraib (BCCF). * Failing to ensure that
Soldiers under his direct control were properly trained in and followed the
IROE. * Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct control knew,
understood, and followed the protections afforded to detainees in the
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. *
Failing to properly supervise soldiers under his direct authority working
and "visiting" Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
5. (U) That MAJ David W. DiNenna, Sr., S-3, 320th MP Battalion, be
Relieved from his position as the Battalion S-3 and be given a General
Officer Memorandum of Reprimand for the following acts which have been
previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:
* Received a GOMOR from LTG McKiernan, Commander CFLCC, on 25
May 2003, for dereliction of duty for failing to report a violation of
CENTCOM General Order #1 by a subordinate Field Grade Officer and
Senior Noncommissioned Officer, which he personally observed; GOMOR
was returned to Soldier and not filed. * Failing to take corrective action
and implement recommendations from various 15-6 investigations even
after receiving a GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP
Brigade, on 10 November 03, for failing to take corrective security
measures as ordered; GOMOR was filed locally. * Failing to take
appropriate action and report an incident of detainee abuse, whereby he
personally witnessed a Soldier throw a detainee from the back of a truck.
6. (U) That CPT Donald J. Reese, Commander, 372nd MP Company, be
Relieved from Command and be given a General Officer Memorandum of
Reprimand for the following acts which have been previously referred to
in the aforementioned findings:
* Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct command knew and
understood the protections afforded to detainees in the Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. * Failing to
properly supervise his Soldiers working and "visiting" Tier 1 of the
Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF). * Failing to properly establish and
enforce basic soldier standards, proficiency, and accountability. * Failing
to ensure that Soldiers under his direct command were properly trained in
Internment and Resettlement Operations.
7. (U) That 1LT Lewis C. Raeder, Platoon Leader, 372nd MP Company, be
Relieved from his duties as Platoon Leader and be given a General
Officer Memorandum of Reprimand for the following acts which have been
previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:
* Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct command knew and
understood the protections afforded to detainees in the Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. * Failing to
properly supervise his soldiers working and "visiting" Tier 1 of the
Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF). * Failing to properly establish and
enforce basic Soldier standards, proficiency, and accountability. * Failing
to ensure that Soldiers under his direct command were properly trained in
Internment and Resettlement Operations.
8. (U) That SGM Marc Emerson, Operations SGM, 320th MP Battalion, be
Relieved from his duties and given a General Officer Memorandum of
Reprimand for the following acts which have been previously referred to
in the aforementioned findings:
* Making a material misrepresentation to the Investigation Team stating
that he had "never" been admonished or reprimanded by BG Karpinski,
when in fact he had been admonished for failing to obey an order from BG
Karpinski to "stay out of the towers" at the holding facility. * Making a
material misrepresentation to the Investigation Team stating that he had
attended every shift change/guard-mount conducted at the 320th MP
Battalion, and that he personally briefed his Soldiers on the proper
treatment of detainees, when in fact numerous statements contradict this
assertion. * Failing to ensure that Soldiers in the 320th MP Battalion
knew and understood the protections afforded to detainees in the Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. * Failing to
properly supervise his soldiers working and "visiting" Tier 1 of the
Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF). * Failing to properly establish and
enforce basic soldier standards, proficiency, and accountability. * Failing
to ensure that his Soldiers were properly trained in Internment and
Resettlement Operations.
9. (U) That 1SG Brian G. Lipinski, First Sergeant, 372nd MP Company, be
Relieved from his duties as First Sergeant of the 372nd MP Company and
given a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand for the following acts
which have been previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:
* Failing to ensure that Soldiers in the 372nd MP Company knew and
understood the protections afforded to detainees in the Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. * Failing to
properly supervise his soldiers working and "visiting" Tier 1 of the
Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF). * Failing to properly establish and
enforce basic soldier standards, proficiency, and accountability. * Failing
to ensure that his Soldiers were properly trained in Internment and
Resettlement Operations.
10. (U) That SFC Shannon K. Snider, Platoon Sergeant, 372nd MP
Company, be Relieved from his duties, receive a General Officer
Memorandum of Reprimand, and receive action under the Uniform Code
of Military Justice for the following acts which have been previously
referred to in the aforementioned findings:
* Failing to ensure that Soldiers in his platoon knew and understood the
protections afforded to detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War. * Failing to properly supervise his
soldiers working and "visiting" Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib
(BCCF). * Failing to properly establish and enforce basic soldier
standards, proficiency, and accountability. * Failing to ensure that his
Soldiers were properly trained in Internment and Resettlement
Operations. * Failing to report a Soldier, who under his direct control,
abused detainees by stomping on their bare hands and feet in his
presence.
11. (U) That Mr. Steven Stephanowicz, Contract US Civilian Interrogator,
CACI, 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, be given an Official Reprimand
to be placed in his employment file, termination of employment, and
generation of a derogatory report to revoke his security clearance for the
following acts which have been previously referred to in the
aforementioned findings:
* Made a false statement to the investigation team regarding the
locations of his interrogations, the activities during his interrogations,
and his knowledge of abuses. * Allowed and/or instructed MPs, who were
not trained in interrogation techniques, to facilitate interrogations by
"setting conditions" which were neither authorized and in accordance with
applicable regulations/policy. He clearly knew his instructions equated to
physical abuse.
12. (U) That Mr. John Israel,Contract US Civilian Interpreter, CACI, 205th
Military Intelligence Brigade, be given an Official Reprimand to be placed
in his employment file and have his security clearance reviewed by
competent authority for the following acts or concerns which have been
previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:
* Denied ever having seen interrogation processes in violation of the
IROE, which is contrary to several witness statements. * Did not have a
security clearance.
13. (U) I find that there is sufficient credible information to warrant an
Inquiry UP Procedure 15, AR 381-10, US Army Intelligence Activities, be
conducted to determine the extent of culpability of MI personnel,
assigned to the 205th MI Brigade and the Joint Interrogation and
Debriefing Center (JIDC) at Abu Ghraib (BCCF). Specifically, I suspect that
COL Thomas M. Pappas, LTC Steve L. Jordan, Mr. Steven Stephanowicz,
and Mr. John Israel were either directly or indirectly responsible for the
abuses at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) and strongly recommend immediate
disciplinary action as described in the preceding paragraphs as well as
the initiation of a Procedure 15 Inquiry to determine the full extent of their
culpability. (Annex 36)
OTHER FINDINGS/OBSERVATIONS
1. (U) Due to the nature and scope of this investigation, I acquired the
assistance of Col (Dr.) Henry Nelson, a USAF Psychiatrist, to analyze the
investigation materials from a psychological perspective. He determined
that there was evidence that the horrific abuses suffered by the detainees
at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) were wanton acts of select soldiers in an
unsupervised and dangerous setting. There was a complex interplay of
many psychological factors and command insufficiencies. A more
detailed analysis is contained in ANNEX 1 of this investigation.
2. (U) During the course of this investigation I conducted a lengthy
interview with BG Karpinski that lasted over four hours, and is included
verbatim in the investigation Annexes. BG Karpinski was extremely
emotional during much of her testimony. What I found particularly
disturbing in her testimony was her complete unwillingness to either
understand or accept that many of the problems inherent in the 800th MP
Brigade were caused or exacerbated by poor leadership and the refusal
of her command to both establish and enforce basic standards and
principles among its Soldiers. (ANNEX 45)
3. (U) Throughout the investigation, we observed many individual
Soldiers and some subordinate units under the 800th MP Brigade that
overcame significant obstacles, persevered in extremely poor conditions,
and upheld the Army Values. We discovered numerous examples of
Soldiers and Sailors taking the initiative in the absence of leadership and
accomplishing their assigned tasks.
a. (U) The 744th MP Battalion, commanded by LTC Dennis McGlone,
efficiently operated the HVD Detention Facility at Camp Cropper and met
mission requirements with little to no guidance from the 800th MP
Brigade. The unit was disciplined, proficient, and appeared to understand
their basic tasks.
b. (U) The 530th MP Battalion, commanded by LTC Stephen J. Novotny,
effectively maintained the MEK Detention Facility at Camp Ashraf. His
Soldiers were proficient in their individual tasks and adapted well to this
highly unique and non-doctrinal operation.
c. (U) The 165th MI Battalion excelled in providing perimeter security and
force protection at Abu Ghraib (BCCF). LTC Robert P. Walters, Jr.,
demanded standards be enforced and worked endlessly to improve
discipline throughout the FOB.
4. (U) The individual Soldiers and Sailors that we observed and believe
should be favorably noted include:
a. (U) Master-at-Arms First Class William J. Kimbro, US Navy Dog
Handler, knew his duties and refused to participate in improper
interrogations despite significant pressure from the MI personnel at Abu
Ghraib.
b. (U) SPC Joseph M. Darby, 372nd MP Company discovered evidence of
abuse and turned it over to military law enforcement.
c. (U) 1LT David O. Sutton, 229th MP Company, took immediate action
and stopped an abuse, then reported the incident to the chain of
command.
CONCLUSION
1. (U) Several US Army Soldiers have committed egregious acts and
grave breaches of international law at Abu Ghraib/BCCF and Camp Bucca,
Iraq. Furthermore, key senior leaders in both the 800th MP Brigade and
the 205th MI Brigade failed to comply with established regulations,
policies, and command directives in preventing detainee abuses at Abu
Ghraib (BCCF) and at Camp Bucca during the period August 2003 to
February 2004.
2. (U) Approval and implementation of the recommendations of this AR
15-6 Investigation and those highlighted in previous assessments are
essential to establish the conditions with the resources and personnel
required to prevent future occurrences of detainee abuse.
Annexes
Psychological AssessmentRequest for investigation from CJTF-7 to
CENTCOMDirective to CFLCC from CENTCOM directing
investigationAppointment Memo from CFLCC CDR to MG Taguba15-6
Investigation 9 June 200315-6 Investigation 12 June 200315-6
Investigation 13 June 200315-6 Investigation 24 November 200315-6
Investigation 7 January 2004 15-6 Investigation 12 January 2004 SIR 5
November 2003 SIR 7 November 2003SIR 8 November 2003SIR 13
December 2003SIR 13 December 2003SIR 13 December 2003SIR 17
December 2003Commander's Inquiry 26 January 2004MG Ryder's
Report, 6 November 2003MG Miller's Report, 9 September 2003AR 190-8,
Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees, and
Other Detainees, 1 October 1997FM 3-19.40, Military Police
Internment/Resettlement Operations, 1 August 2001FM 34-52, Intelligence
Interrogation, 28 September 1992Fourth Geneva Convention, 12 August
1949CID Report on criminal abuses at Abu Ghraib, 28 January 2004CID
Interviews, 10-25 January 2004800th MP Brigade Roster, 29 January
2004205th MI Brigade's IROE, UndatedTOA Order (800th MP Brigade) and
letter holding witnessesInvestigation Team's witness listFRAGO
#1108Letters suspending several key leaders in the 800th MP Brigade
and Rating Chain with suspensions annotated FM 27-10, Military Justice,
6 September 2002CID Report on abuse of detainees at Camp Bucca, 8
June 2003Article 32 Findings on abuse of detainees at Camp Bucca, 26
August 2003AR 381-10, 1 July 1984Excerpts from log books, 320th MP
Battalion310th MP Battalion's Inprocessing SOP320th MP Battalion's
"Change Sheet"Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center's (JIDC) Slides,
UndatedOrder of Battle Slides, 12 January 2004Joint Publication 0-2,
Unified Actions Armed Forces, 10 July 2001General Officer
Memorandums of Reprimand800th MP Battalion's TACSOPBG Janis
Karpinski, Commander, 800th MP Brigade
46. COL Thomas Pappas, Commander, 205th MI Brigade
47. COL Ralph Sabatino, CFLCC Judge Advocate, CPA Ministry of Justice
48. LTC Gary W. Maddocks, S-5 and Executive Officer, 800th MP Brigade
49. LTC James O'Hare, Command Judge Advocate, 800th MP Brigade
50. LTC Robert P. Walters Jr., Commander, 165th MI Battalion (Tactical
exploitation)
51. LTC James D. Edwards, Commander, 202nd MI Battalion
52. LTC Vincent Montera, Commander 310th MP Battalion
53. LTC Steve Jordan, former Director, Joint Interrogation and Debriefing
Center/LNO to the 205th MI Brigade
54. LTC Leigh A. Coulter, Commander 724th MP Battalion and OIC Arifjan
Detachment, 800th MP Brigade
55. LTC Dennis McGlone, Commander, 744th MP Battalion
56. MAJ David Hinzman, S-1, 800th MP Brigade
57. MAJ William D. Proietto, Deputy CJA, 800th MP Brigade
58. MAJ Stacy L. Garrity, S-1 (FWD), 800th MP Brigade
59. MAJ David W. DiNenna, S-3, 320th MP Battalion
60. MAJ Michael Sheridan, XO, 320th MP Battalion
61. MAJ Anthony Cavallaro, S-3, 800th MP Brigade
62. CPT Marc C. Hale, Commander, 670th MP Company
63. CPT Donald Reese, Commander, 372nd MP Company
64. CPT Darren Hampton, Assistant S-3, 320th MP Battalion
65. CPT John Kaires, S-3, 310th MP Battalion
66. CPT Ed Diamantis, S-2, 800th MP Brigade
67. LTC Jerry L. Phillabaum, Commander, 320th MP Battalion
68. CPT James G. Jones, Commander, 229th MP Company
69. CPT Michael A. Mastrangelo, Jr., Commander, 310th MP Company
70. CPT Lawrence Bush, IG, 800th MP Brigade
71. 1LT Lewis C. Raeder, Platoon Leader, 372nd MP Company
72. 1LT Elvis Mabry, Aide-de-Camp to Brigade Commander, 800th MP
Brigade
73. 1LT Warren E. Ford, II, Commander, HHC 320th MP Battalion
74. 2LT David O. Sutton, Platoon Leader, 229th MP Company
75. CW2 Edward J. Rivas, 205th MI Brigade
76. CSM Joseph P. Arrison, Command Sergeant Major, 320th MP
Battalion
77. SGM Pascual Cartagena, Command Sergeant Major, 800th MP
Brigade
78. CSM Timothy L. Woodcock, Command Sergeant Major, 310th MP
Battalion
79. 1SG Dawn J. Rippelmeyer, First Sergeant, 977th MP Company
80. SGM Mark Emerson, Operations SGM, 320th MP Battalion
81. MSG Brian G. Lipinski, First Sergeant, 372nd MP Company
82. MSG Andrew J. Lombardo, Operations Sergeant, 310th MP Battalion
83. SFC Daryl J. Plude, Platoon Sergeant, 229th MP Company
84. SFC Shannon K. Snider, Platoon SGT, 372nd MP Company
85. SFC Keith A. Comer, 372nd MP Company
86. SSG Robert Elliot, Squad Leader, 372nd MP Company
87. SSG Santos A. Cardona, Army Dog Handler
88. SGT Michael Smith, Army Dog Handler
89. MA1 William J. Kimbro, USN Dog Handler
90. Mr. Steve Stephanowicz, US civilian contract Interrogator, CACI, 205th
MI Brigade
91. Mr. John Israel, US civilian contract Interpreter, Titan Corporation,
205th MI Brigade
92. FM 3-19.1, Military Police Operations, 22 March 2001
93. CJTF-7 IROE and DROE, Undated
94. CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter Resistance Policy, 12 October 2003
95. 800th MP Brigade Mobilization Orders
96. Sample Detainee Status Report, 13 March 2004
97. 530th MP Battalion Mission Brief, 11 February 2004
98. Memorandum for Record, CPT Ed Ray, Chief of Military Justice,
CFLCC, 9 March 2004
99. SIR 14 January 2004
100. Accountability Plan Recommendations, 9 March 2004
101. 2LT Michael R. Osterhout, S-2, 320th MP Battalion
102. Memorandum of Admonishment from LTG Sanchez to BG Karpinski,
17
January 2004
103. Various SIRs from the 800th MP Brigade/320th MP Battalion
104. 205th MI Brigade SITREP to MG Miller, 12 December 2003
105. SGT William A. Cathcart, 372nd MP Company
106. 1LT Michael A. Drayton, Commander, 870th MP Company
Thursday, May 06, 2004
Wednesday, May 05, 2004
Haaretz - Israel News - Article: "According to Abbas, immediately thereafter Bush said: 'God told me to strike at al Qaida and I struck them, and then he instructed me to strike at Saddam, which I did, and now I am determined to solve the problem in the Middle East. If you help me I will act, and if not, the elections will come and I will have to focus on them.' "
Sunday, May 02, 2004
Letter to President Bush on the War on Terrorism: "We agree with Secretary of State Powell?9s recent statement that Saddam Hussein ?Cis one of the leading terrorists on the face of the Earth?6.?D It may be that the Iraqi government provided assistance in some form to the recent attack on the United States. But even if evidence does not link Iraq directly to the attack, any strategy aiming at the eradication of terrorism and its sponsors must include a determined effort to remove Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq. Failure to undertake such an effort will constitute an early and perhaps decisive surrender in the war on international terrorism. The United States must therefore provide full military and financial support to the Iraqi opposition. American military force should be used to provide a ?Csafe zone?D in Iraq from which the opposition can operate. And American forces must be prepared to back up our commitment to the Iraqi opposition by all necessary means.
Hezbollah"
Hezbollah"
Saturday, May 01, 2004
PRACTICE FOR 'MY TURN'
where am i goin to go on this. should i be aggressive, or passive?
i guess that would heavily depend on the time of day, and what drug.
ok, here we go:
####>
I have been sitting here watching cable news channels, and the 60 minutes story is on fire. Maybe not here in America, but you can bet your life that the images of American torture in Saddam's old torture prison, Abu Ghraib, have made us lose whatever respect we had about this war from almost every corner of the globe.
I'm sorry, but that's just not something I can be proud of.
Yes, the few who are guilty of smiling in these torture sessions, standing proud over their victims, should not reflect the rest of America. We all know that. The problem is, will the rest of the world. Our credibility was already treading on thin ice. We hardly need to dig ourselves deeper in this mess.
Supporting the troops is still the #1 priority that this country should be having right now. We are at war. Or so we're told. Usually, a war has a goal. One that usually is not won by reduction, but rather elimination of the threat. And in all previous cases, that threat was not something we have created. This time, however, we have a whole new game unfolding. It's detailed in a document called the PNAC: Project for the New American Century. Google that and be prepared to have your jaws drop.
But our troops are dying at an unacceptable rate, and for what? We were first told about weapons of mass destruction. You remember those don't you? If FOX had its way, you wouldn't. Then we were told that they had nukes. Well, we all know what happened there. From that point on, things started to get a bit ugly, and some really far-fetched ideas were borne, and we now were in this liberation mode. Providing freedom to a people that have been so oppresed by, oops, someone we helped. And not just someone, the very same people who are in power now. Oh the irony.
The families of many of the troops have taken collections, and done other benefits to raise money to buy the simple things, like armour for our men & women over there. This is just outrageous. This is like saying to your employer, I'm going to pay YOU this year. We need to furnish our troops with the necessities of battleground war. The very fact that we're in this "guerilla" war, makes it all the more unlikely that our troops have the experience our enemies have.
The president was indeed right when he stated (for once) that this was a war that would last a long time. He's confident of his next term. Too confident. The electronic voting & internet voting, should be closely scrutinized, like California. Voting is the very heart of our democracy. And it's up to the American people (still) to control how we play in this sandbox we call Earth.
where am i goin to go on this. should i be aggressive, or passive?
i guess that would heavily depend on the time of day, and what drug.
ok, here we go:
####>
I have been sitting here watching cable news channels, and the 60 minutes story is on fire. Maybe not here in America, but you can bet your life that the images of American torture in Saddam's old torture prison, Abu Ghraib, have made us lose whatever respect we had about this war from almost every corner of the globe.
I'm sorry, but that's just not something I can be proud of.
Yes, the few who are guilty of smiling in these torture sessions, standing proud over their victims, should not reflect the rest of America. We all know that. The problem is, will the rest of the world. Our credibility was already treading on thin ice. We hardly need to dig ourselves deeper in this mess.
Supporting the troops is still the #1 priority that this country should be having right now. We are at war. Or so we're told. Usually, a war has a goal. One that usually is not won by reduction, but rather elimination of the threat. And in all previous cases, that threat was not something we have created. This time, however, we have a whole new game unfolding. It's detailed in a document called the PNAC: Project for the New American Century. Google that and be prepared to have your jaws drop.
But our troops are dying at an unacceptable rate, and for what? We were first told about weapons of mass destruction. You remember those don't you? If FOX had its way, you wouldn't. Then we were told that they had nukes. Well, we all know what happened there. From that point on, things started to get a bit ugly, and some really far-fetched ideas were borne, and we now were in this liberation mode. Providing freedom to a people that have been so oppresed by, oops, someone we helped. And not just someone, the very same people who are in power now. Oh the irony.
The families of many of the troops have taken collections, and done other benefits to raise money to buy the simple things, like armour for our men & women over there. This is just outrageous. This is like saying to your employer, I'm going to pay YOU this year. We need to furnish our troops with the necessities of battleground war. The very fact that we're in this "guerilla" war, makes it all the more unlikely that our troops have the experience our enemies have.
The president was indeed right when he stated (for once) that this was a war that would last a long time. He's confident of his next term. Too confident. The electronic voting & internet voting, should be closely scrutinized, like California. Voting is the very heart of our democracy. And it's up to the American people (still) to control how we play in this sandbox we call Earth.
Thursday, April 29, 2004
how can you bomb a civilization that has been around since the beginning of time? the military industrial complex was first examined, and warned about, back in the 50's. the very fact that abuse has taken place, much less the TYPE of abuse it was, makes it clear. there is the same criminal element in the military as there is in the general population. the military is not some 'select' group of the human race. it's a collection of the same elements, both good and bad, that make up the majority of the fighting force.
that the criminal and military element bode well with the mentality of doing harm to someone else, should be further testament to the philosophy of using the military in strict defensive operations. period.
that the criminal and military element bode well with the mentality of doing harm to someone else, should be further testament to the philosophy of using the military in strict defensive operations. period.
when you fight a war, you don't fight with the objective to 'reduce', you fight to eliminate. that's what a war is all about.
so when we hear about the war on crime, or the war on drugs, it's a war that can't be won by 'eliminating' yet can be by 'reducing'? certainly the war on 'terrorism' is in the same boat.
so when we hear about the war on crime, or the war on drugs, it's a war that can't be won by 'eliminating' yet can be by 'reducing'? certainly the war on 'terrorism' is in the same boat.
Tuesday, April 27, 2004
Sunday, April 25, 2004
i wonder.... what do those fathers & mothers, who were screaming about janet jacket's breast being exposed on superbowl, which they most likely never saw in real time, but rather through the ad nauseum coverage it got, what do they say to their children about the other commercials during the game that warned viewers about seeking medical attention if an erection lasted longer than four hours.
Friday, April 23, 2004
Tuesday, April 20, 2004
first, we were attacked by a bunch of saudi terrorists.
then we bombed afghanistan
then we claimed saddam had wmd
then we bombed iraq
when we didn't find any wmd, it was a war of liberation
now that they have been liberated, it's a war of ... what?
and if the total reasoning for iraq is based upon the fact that saddam was a bad man, then when are we going to start bombing north korea? or china for that matter.
how can we possibly be capable of telling a society that has existed for thousands of years how to live?
then we bombed afghanistan
then we claimed saddam had wmd
then we bombed iraq
when we didn't find any wmd, it was a war of liberation
now that they have been liberated, it's a war of ... what?
and if the total reasoning for iraq is based upon the fact that saddam was a bad man, then when are we going to start bombing north korea? or china for that matter.
how can we possibly be capable of telling a society that has existed for thousands of years how to live?
Sunday, April 18, 2004
Saturday, April 17, 2004
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